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It seems key to me that feelings are what we compare across time, since any other kind of 
experience would not be as well able to combine different amounts and intensities of the more 
precise, determinative aspects we ascribe to our functions of knowledge. Only a feeling can serve 
as both a guide for comparison across contexts and a method by which, once that comparison has 
occurred, the mind can hold up more than one set of information through one or several moments 
under the guise of a singular instance of sentiment. In other constructions, the under-web of the 
scaffolding, so to speak, of that particular idea in the last sentence—put broadly as “what 
feelings can do (and can do for us) across cases”—is sometimes actually something like, only a 
feeling can serve as a method by which a comparison across time can hold up for the mind more 
than one set of information in one or several moments under the guise of a singular instance of 
sentiment, after that mind’s having felt multiple instances connected to, by, or whatever was just 
existing as one sentiment, the sentiment that indeed spurred it all by being composed of multiple 
rather than just one set of contexts. In that case, but perhaps only that one, order matters.  
[This is this most accurate description I have of what it’s like to be born and then learn 
language and then (put? Understand through the act of understanding?) how one feels into 
language on this small rock flying across space through the randomness of existence: “I am both 
intrigued and confused”. This is how everything really starts.] 
In the following paper, I illuminate the messy areas underneath and surrounding our own 
thinking about the affinities that we use to compare different contexts across time to attempt to 
understand things in certain ways, see things in certain ways, and mean different things at 
different times during our speaking and writing all while somehow maintaining some random 




mean right now, and could mean in the future, each aspect of which itself appears always to be 
arising in different amounts and intensities of feeling at each specific time. Later, I reach down 
into what I conceive of as the infinitely splitting architecture of the ever changing processes of 
our feelings, the under-grid of how our sentiments slide over into one another in varying amounts 
of felt and collected “intensity-tied-to-amount” instances across space and time, shifting in 
randomly collected ways as they continually go, in order to illuminate how the forever splitting 
functions of context comparison that were conceived of more clearly earlier on in the process can 
endlessly shift during sustained attention to how this very shifting feels and in this way 
complicate matters of comprehension during that kind of feeling across time even further. The 
infinite architecture of the ever splitting processes of our thinking and feeling that I attempt to 
illuminate through in fact a similarly infinite and ever splitting process of thinking and feeling 
does not reject the idea that each moment brings with it a new bounded instant of sentiment, to 
such an extent that trying to understand how certain feelings can be considered the same across 
time is a futile one, stuck as we are in each moment with an only-then occurrence to tell us 
whether a singularly felt sentiment is the same as it was before or not. Rather, my elucidation of 
this ever splitting structure of processes of sentiment aims to circumvent, or at least for now 
sidestep, the problem of thinking and feeling across time altogether, by favoring instead to leap 
into and reckon more closely with the intensely chaotic scaffolding that may form our thoughts 
physically across existence and provide these feelings for us in ways we often have very little 
ability to access. The process of reckoning with the infinitely shifting structures of processing 
sentiment that appear to comprise our feelings by using the same processing structure of that 
infinite architecture of endlessly splitting processes of sentiment is what I imagine, at least for 




The paper begins with an exploration of several different ways we can interpret Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, specifically when trying to understand the meaning 
of a word. This is in order to establish a clear groundwork for the larger sets of thinking about 
context comparison across time via feelings that will come up uniquely throughout as well as 
more deeply in considerations of the infinite architecture of shifting processes of sentiment later. 
The different ways of interpreting Wittgenstein’s work that we will begin with are not meant to 
fall into a straight line of clearly conceived correctness and incorrectness or even 
straightforwardness and more involved. Rather, they are meant to show the hyperflexible, and 
infinitely splitting, nature of the thinking that occurs even on the ground level of the 
Investigations. After we see that the very idea of having a meaning of a word is an endlessly 
messy endeavor to undertake to comprehend, we will enter into manifestly psychological 
considerations where a deeper question will more clearly emerge from the feelings about 
feelings that arise then: The depth of the feelings we use to compare contexts (in different ways 
at different places!) across time is always going to be mysterious to us. So how do I know what I 
feel beyond the words? How is even it possible to have this be a real question? Since knowing 
the “is” of a feeling—on both the outside and inside, “outside” being what a feeling is more 
generally across multiple occurrences in time, and “inside” being what a particular idea and 
instance of a feeling is as we feel it—since knowing this information is important, what, then, 
actually is a feeling beyond the sum of all the cases in which we utter the word feeling? Or in 
which we posit the idea of feeling as being a something, or often multiple sets of somethings, 
that exists behind the state of the things I want to describe? (I’m saying there is something else 
besides just what I want to describe, existing a layer below it, as the state that is being described. 




one that draws on multiple sets of ideas about what the physical world is apart from any of its 
potential mental counterparts, and one that as well has infinitely many possibilities when it 
comes to any mixing of the two.) We can also then ask: What is a feeling, not just when we use 
the word feeling to describe what is there when we have thoughts about feelings or feelings in 
general (i.e., we do the thing we often call feel), but rather, to extend out and say, well, I’m not 
sure what this is, so let’s call it feeling? In a sense, when we create? Creation is usually very 
different to the mindset of descriptive processing. This question of what a feeling physically is 
might not matter much when it comes to Wittgenstein’s own thoughts about what a word means, 
but when it gets down to what a word can actually do when we want to create new 
understandings more than just describe, this, in a similar vein, becomes the newer, more 
meaningful question: What is a feeling when we are trying to create new understandings with 
feelings more than we are trying to describe (or even sometimes low-level create new 
understandings with feelings) with words? This then seems really to extend into the idea of ‘How 
do we know the depth of the feelings that arise, and so forth?’, because the felt depth is what 
spurs us to understand things in certain ways or see things as particular things or not, especially 
psychologically, but also with and within more empirical, ostensive maneuvers as well. The 
depth to the feelings in each instance are what spur, then, different modes of categorization of 
knowledge, when that categorization of knowledge, as an activity, takes up the form of feeling 
out different affinities between different contexts across time and placing current ones into them, 
and so forth. But how we feel feelings more strongly in certain instances than others, and how 
we end up feeling certain sets of contexts in our comparisons in lieu of (all) others remains 
fundamentally mysterious still. If it seems that feelings holding onto multiple different contexts 




felt information to compare with other such sets across time based on the as well arbitrary 
amounts of their intensities that come up in the intensities of feeling we are already engaged in 
the processes of (the processes of the processes of and so on down forever) comparing, then we 
have also to admit of the possibility that the creation of feelings is another kind of process that 
occurs more often than we seem to realize, since at some point within the infinite and ever-
splitting gradients of those moments and what they feel like within those instances is a subtle 
shift to the act of creation. That is, when we create new ideas about things, or just stumble upon 
them, we first reckon with the depth of feelings, the intensities and amounts of what we feel 
when we think to categorize, understand, see as, and so forth, and we do this reckoning with the 
feelings in their specific amounts and intensities before going to the act of comparison of 
different contexts and affinities across those different contexts to place a certain feeling in there 
accordingly (according(ly), first, that is, to the infinitely extending contexts that go forever down 
with their own contexts of contexts, which contexts were engaged in the same process, and so on 
and so forth; then second, to the intensity and amount of the feeling, as both (intensity and 
amount) feel like they relate to certain contexts and not others from within the confines of this 
particular context… and which are as occurrences all masked over as a comparison of contexts, 
it seems? Or where does the feeling part come in within an act of a comparison of contexts? I 
fear it could change each time, in which case, more feelings are necessary to even begin to 
understand the next sets of information arising. This is exactly what we will see—more feelings 
about feelings becoming increasingly necessary to understand all these imperceptible shifts in 
process—as we get deeper into the progression of these thoughts.) Since we do that specific 
reckoning in specific ways in relation to the points of comparison—well, the depths, it here 




mysteriously) drawing sums together and feeling them, in different ways at different spots, and 
so on all the way around and across different contexts and feelings of those contexts. 
Nonetheless, if the order happens to be that we reckon with the feelings of affinities across 
contexts in their particular depths and intensities before we go in to compare different contexts 
and affinities across those different contexts to place a certain feeling in there accordingly in just 
such a way as described above, it not only seems entirely mysterious that we are able to reckon 
with contexts in any non-arbitrary way. It also seems admissible to consider that we are engaged 
in some secretive process of creating feelings for ourselves at some conceivable points along the 
line, perhaps gradients of subtle splitting where the shift from feeling to creating new feeling can 
take up residence in our existence. All of these considerations here are, more than anything, part 
of the infinite architecture of the ever splitting processes of our thinking that will be explored 
much further at the end of section #2 in response to the search for a deeper level of feeling to 
guide our investigations. I hope that this paper can illuminate (and augment the types of thinking 
behind) the processes just described in at least a little way—even if, often, the littlest way turns 
out to be the most confusing of all. Returning to these ideas after reading the rest of the paper, if 
one is new to the idea of determining meaning by shared affinities across context, will enable 
him to make more sense of them.  
[First (#1), I proceed to distinguish between two broad ways of viewing and understanding Part I 
of the Investigation’s call for context consideration when it comes to determining the meaning of 
a word, with one being a pure language game and another being a more expansive look at the 
nature of a word’s context-sensitivity. Ideas of rule-following, methods of projection, the 
infinitely-layered process of understanding how we understand the idea of understanding itself, 




at-different-times-depending-on-where-the-feeling-leads1 word comparison across time arise in a 
primary form. The question of what it means to feel different amounts and intensities as cross-
context points of comparison, meanwhile, will always be in the background, in different ways at 
different times. Second, (#2), I bring into play more explicitly the connection between differing 
amounts and intensities of feelings during context comparison across time by focusing in on 
what happens to be psychological analysis of the infinitely splitting understandings of 
understanding that occur there. Saul Kripke’s solution to the skeptical problem of meaning—that 
our language is continually updated to reflect what basically amount to differing intensities of 
feelings and understandings of those intensities of feelings as far as context comparison is 
concerned, and that our language does this updating through continual re-affirmation by other 
users—will lead us into our final forms of consideration: that feelings create themselves out of 
the infinite architecture of feeling; that there does seem to be an infinitely splitting structure of 
amount and intensity of feeling that forms our conception of how we think; that this infinitely 
splitting architecture of ever shifting (processes of) feeling is not only updated in a method 
reminiscent of Kripke’s vision of shared usage but is also, at the deeper level of this infinitely 
splitting architecture of ever shifting processes of feeling, physically connected in ways we will 






1 I.e., whether the context comparison leads to sets of information which themselves were made from context 
comparison from previous times of, indeed, context comparison, and so on back endlessly. Where the context 
will only go back so far, or where the context does go back very far, these are the types of places from which 





In this section I will discuss several closely related readings of the first half of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, separated arbitrarily and only for the sake of clarity 
into two parts, (a) and (b). The first (a) is a more defined reading that draws the meaning of a 
word primarily from its use within a narrow language game, although we will see that this 
illusion of neatness and packaged “definition” is not one that stands up to considerations of 
additional context. The second (b) is a reading that focuses more clearly on how a word’s having 
meaning does not require that the circumstances surrounding its use remain the same, or even 
have any single thing in common that we could point out, across all cases in time. Part (b) 
discusses this non-fixity of the surrounding contexts of words in conjunction with how the 
understanding of the use, application, or process of application (what Wittgenstein refers to as 
“methods of projection” or “methods of application”) of a word arises differently in each and 
every possible moment. After seeing that (a) and (b) still leave room for the depth of feelings to 
arise as mysterious to our minds, I will gesture towards the corresponding implications before 
diving into a fuller immersion of thinking and feeling about feeling that occurs when we 
submerge ourselves into our own feelings across time to compare different contexts and create.  
 
a. 
Wittgenstein’s example of the language of the builders shows us how a language game functions. 
In Section 2, we are introduced to a situation where two builders use a total of four words to 
communicate: “block”, “pillar”, “slab”, and “beam”. We are told to “conceive of this as a 
complete primitive language”. If, having taken the meaning of that sentence to heart, we come to 




have now bounded ourselves to a language game, a temporary “whole” consisting of “activities 
into which [language] is woven”. Sections 19-20 return to this narrowed world of language to 
show how the meaning of the four words in each instance they are uttered comes only from the 
way they are used within the particular language game. For instance, if the first builder calls 
upon the second to bring him the slab by exclaiming, “slab!”, is this the same as, in our “fuller” 
language, shouting, “bring me the slab!”? It is right here, but how do we know that? It turns out 
that we know that because the use of the word is the same in both cases. This we can summarize 
as: A word cannot be isolated from its surroundings if we wish to determine its meaning; its 
meaning comes only from within its place in the language game. Our first reading, then, so far 
entails sticking to narrow language games in which words derive their meaning from within the 
bounded context of the situation: “block”, “pillar”, “slab” and “beam” are the limits of this 
language game; once each has been defined, there is no question about what the meaning of any 
word is—so long, of course, as the context itself does not suddenly expand and require new 
decisions of meaning to be made (a process constitutive of a different case—indeed, many 
different sets of cases—we will discuss in the next paragraph.) This first reading also, in the 
spirit of the new line of inquiry that occurs alongside thinking about Sections 19-20, begins to 
lead us in the direction of believing that our understanding of the meaning of a word is mainly 
based on its comparative use: we compare the use of a word in two different sentences to know 
that “slab!”, as it is used in the limited language, means “bring me a slab!” in a less limited 
language. 
It is possible to be clearer still about what is happening here prior to the larger instances 
of use that I just introduced by calling upon Sections 19-20. The following extension will 




reading (a), which we initiated above by conceiving of the limited language game of the two 
builders as the entirety of our thought-space before hinting at what happens when context 
expands. The builders in this delimited thought-space only know what each of the four words 
refers to because, we might imagine, someone once pointed to each pile of however-many 
objects and uttered the word to correspond to it, thus creating a bounded language game in which 
each time one builder asks for one of the words, the other builder knows which pile to take an 
object from. This is how the builders have learned to understand in this one context. The 
surrounding activities accompanying the occurrences of the builders’ understanding across time 
are the ostensive maneuvers that built the bounded system with which they engage; for instance, 
the activity of pointing to a pile and confining the use of the word to something from that pile 
creates the impetus for any subsequent moments of object-retrieval that might occur after the 
initial bounding. Thus, any orders they attempt to fulfill in the spirit of the now-defined language 
game will proceed from the rules that initiated and co-occurred with their moments of coming to 
understand, which as instances of coming to understand were themselves the activities that 
accompanied any successive ‘surrounding moments of understanding’. But then we can get even, 
even clearer by expanding the context: Imagine if we introduce into our builders’ piles a new 
object with properties similar to one of the types of building materials—properties similar, say, 
to a “block”. Then one builder asks the other to fetch him a block, and the second builder pulls 
out the object of new material from the pile where blocks usually go. He will not doubt for a 
moment that it is a block still, because the limits of his world have been circumscribed by the 
original decision that each object from that particular pile is a block. In a less limited world, of 
course, more factors tend to come into play, such that a person reaching into the pile expecting to 




others, and at some point would likely even want to make a determination about what it means 
for a block to be a block. This wider case, more reflective of most of the cases we find in our real 
world, illustrates a broader point about context: Sometimes it is the case that we decide every 
moment anew what it is that constitutes that something which we will choose to call a particular 
word; i.e., here, the person will look at the object and decide whether it has enough in common 
with another object from the block pile to constitute a block, or whether it can be used in a way 
similar enough to the block that its function won’t be impeded by whatever it may lack if it is 
used as a block. (Sometimes, though, I do want to note, it will be the case instead that these use-
establishing questions carry over across several or more moments of comprehension and thereby 
ultimately mask any concomitant instances of decision-making by creating the sensation, within 
the new, more wide-ranging occurrences of understanding that follow an initial decision about 
use, that the precise, definitional aspect of the word as it is used either alone or in states of 
extension or multiplicity has been there all along, unaltered from its originally-determined 
meaning, and proceeding to subsequent uses in a fixed line of accepted-understandings stemming 
directly from the first event, rather than at every twist and turn recreated and reevaluated for 
utilization. For instance, someone might look at the block and wonder whether it does, indeed, 
“have enough in common with another object from the block pile to constitute a block”—and 
even whether, in fact, the overall manifestations of its usage along lines similar to those where 
the word was previously indicated can truly constitute something of a grander type of use that in 
summation would only ever have to be peripherally capable of continual re-maintenance during 
any and all subsequent processes of life and forms of inherently-accompanying activity, activity 
where, to begin with, the word is repeated in instances of affinity and, as a follow-up to that, 




unconsciously at every moment as processes of comparison, evaluation, and determination come 
to the forefront to generate non-methodological approaches to lived-in meaning, in order to 
create that meaning—someone might look at the block in these ways in and even from within the 
inner confines of many different examples, ultimately giving rise to the feeling within himself 
that what was established to be the case across multiple exemplifications of the use of the same 
word is somehow all-powerful and entirely transcendent, despite the fact that this closer 
inspection reveals how even during times when the repeated use of the same word conceals the 
fundamentally world-underpinning nature of the occupation of context-comparison, a decision is 
still being made to either accept or reject the use of the word even, or perhaps especially, when, 
e.g., an object is deemed to be not quite wholly a block. This itself tends to mean overall that the 
meaning of a word like “block” is always contextual and dependent on every single moment of 
our determination, since even when we think a meaning of a word has been somehow completely 
chosen and therefore also entirely bounded, we still make choices to accept or reject the meaning 
when comparisons of context recreate the same conditions that spurred the apparently original 
instance of understanding and force us to determine what the context of the new situation is.) 
Zoomed out even more from these sorts of cases, we can easily imagine the first person to 
construct a block from only certain types of material, or in only specific kinds of shapes, making 
a series of decisions in each moment about whether the literal creation of the block was fitting 
enough to his vision, asking questions about whether the type of material would work for his 
purposes, whether the exact location of each cross-section or corner of the material could create 
just the right angle to bound the block in such perfect conditions, whether irreducible points 
could even exist that would allow for a “complete” block rather than a creation of something 




always to these very inquires as to use! Nonetheless, the upshot of both (or even, if we include 
the “masking” case above, all three) of these occasions of use-clarification is that there is some 
moment, or series of moments, during which we determine the limits of our world. The first case 
happened to involve a type of baptismal initiation, where in the beginning the builders defined 
these limits by pointing to the piles of objects and circumscribing the use of the words so. The 
second case turned out to entail making decisions every moment about whether and what 
something would be called, effectively recreating anew what the case was and answering 
differently in every instance if, for example, the object could be classified as a block or not. The 
third complicated things further by showing that zooming-out to expand the consideration of 
contexts actually sometimes signifies what we might just for now refer to as zooming-in, going 
down into the minute moments of literal block-creation, for instance, to see that any sort of 
irreducibility is unlikely to exist on many levels for many reasons, the likes of which we saw 
across layered examples. Taken together, these two or three cases contribute to our current 
understanding: meaning comes from an indiscrete and comparative activity of use-analysis even 
when within the confines of a narrow and bounded language game (and certainly when we step 
outside, one level or even several out, expanding the context like we did in the zoomed-out 
instances.) We have also learned from this particular extension that getting even clearer about 
something actually means expanding context, as exemplified by the zoom-outs: If we begin the 
process of extending our view of the context of the meaning of the word “block” with, for one, 
an intent to discover what conditions surrounded not only the use of a word during certain 
supposed times of its creation but also any subsequent iterations of that word that occur across 
time and, for another, with an eye towards clarifying the surrounding moments of understanding 




understand, what we end up seeing is that the moments that are less limited, and, indeed, more 
zoomed-out—besides showing us both the flexibility and restraint of our definition-giving 
powers—demonstrate mainly that the use of words is a comparative activity that takes place in 
our minds even when our activities of determination are wrapped up in these zoomed-out 
situations, e.g., the fast- and for all intents and purposes infinitely-  splitting game(s) of “block”-
making decisions.  
This fairly ostensive language game is not the whole story, of course, because our 
understanding and learning themselves do not happen in isolation. We have already seen a slight 
case of this in grappling with Sections 19-20 above; the use of the word, it must be reiterated, is 
what determines its meaning and allows us, as per our example, to know that “slab!” in a more 
limited language means the same thing as “bring me a slab!” in a less limited language since the 
context in which each is uttered is the same. But even examining this type of language game 
alongside the more extensive use-case situations of circumstance like the “block” iterations 
above cannot be the extent of how we come to know or create the meaning of words. Even, in 
fact, entering into more detailed scenarios—such as the infinite gradients of the methods of 
procession of accepted understandings—will not ever be all-encompassing to any stopping point 
as far as the decisive aspects of considerations of meanings of words go. In Section 23, 
Wittgenstein tells us that “new language games come into existence every moment” while others 
are discarded. The increasingly indiscrete vision that this part of Section 23 introduces us to 
aligns more closely with zoomed-out situations, like the ones exemplified above, than it does 
with severely limited spheres of language games, i.e., the first half of the building example. Even 
in the zoomed-out situations, however, the context is not sufficient to motivate or fully 




Investigations. In (b) I will address this continuation alongside, and sometimes as, reading (b). 
But before then, we will enter into one other example to show just how messy the comparative 
nature of our understandings of how we come to understand the meanings of words can get.  
Take the idea of trying to figure out the meaning of the words “foresight”, “insight” and 
“hindsight”. Let’s imagine that the three words have come up naturally within a sentence that we 
uttered to describe someone: “He is missing something crucial when it comes to insight and 
foresight. And hindsight, for that matter.” We might start by considering them separately: Not 
having foresight, we think, in this moment, means that this man lacks the ability to predict the 
future—at least, more or less. Not having insight means he cannot enter into the minute workings 
of either day-to-day life or larger sets of information regarding day-to-day life in order to 
understand the ins and outs of their mechanics. And his not having hindsight indicates that he 
also has little ability to understand and critically think about events after they occur. Now, our 
uttering this sentence about this poor man is not something that would occur very often; and we 
know, already, that the words are unique for how they arise individually—that is, following this 
thread, we have good faith that the process that takes place when we considered which words to 
use to describe what this man lacks is a process that compares these instances of use with other 
times when we also used such words, much like the zoomed-out situations of the block examples 
above. Disregarding for now all the ideas that could come into play in the way of context 
“leading-up-to”—i.e., what came before all the cases in which we uttered these words, which 
itself is a set of information that is always changing—we can say for now that these words come 
up when situations where someone is engaged in the same sort of activities of surrounding 




But these three words and their occurrences together are also unique for how they arise in 
conjunction. Say that we want to know, more than anything, how these three words compare to 
one another, because of the fact that, all of a sudden, one of them seems to be less pertinent than 
the other two. What happens is that we start to compare this time to other times that we might 
have compared the use of these words against each other to find the right fit. So, for instance, I 
wonder why I am using the word “foresight” instead of “insight” in this situation. (Well, of 
course, this situation is unique because I am using both of them, and making a clear decision by, 
in fact, not choosing to spare any of them in my usage and description.) But in wondering why I 
am using one word over the other, what I am effectively doing is comparing the times I also 
compared the words, which contain themselves other moments of comparison to other times I 
compared the words when that thinking was the same in its need for context comparison. I am, 
that is, comparing this time of word comparison to other times in which I weighed one word 
against the other, and since it is likely that many of those previous times of comparison had been 
engaged in their own comparisons with times of previous comparison, which had themselves 
been engaged with times of previous comparison, and so on forever down, this one instance of 
comparison of words to find the right fit is a comparison that takes into account many if not all 
other forms of comparison that have happened to get to this point.2  
It seems that it isn’t just a simple case of context comparison that happens between a 
current word and a situation. There are some cases where multiple words are compared against 
each other at different spots along the line—and these spots do carry over to different moments. 
It will sometimes be that we become more aware of the comparisons of comparisons that stretch 
backwards in time, for all intents and purposes indefinitely. But even if we aren’t entirely aware 
 
2 These occurrences of comparison are hyperflexible, but it seems here that they also are not going to ever be 





of the chain of comparisons that spurred the precise definitional aspects of the right now, they 
are still there, influencing us. For instance, even if I am not aware at this particular moment of 
the fact that I compared these three words before to find the right fit (or to find the fit of cases 
where they are used, in different gradients, different amounts of each one, in conjunction, and 
how I described times that that was the case), it will still always be true in some way that the 
comparative aspects of the instances of the use of the three words will be dependent upon the 
comparative aspects of the instances of the use (and comparison of) the three words at other 
times, which times themselves contain the comparative aspects of the instances of use (and 
comparison of) the three words at other times, and so on down for conceivably ever.  
From this it might be tempting to conclude that a word gets its meaning from a forever 
indiscrete process of “going down”; that is, slowly but surely, over time, updating and reupdating 
terms until clarity can be reached through a process of increasing particularity. However, this is 
only one small part of all the cases that we seem to be engaged with all the time. When we try to 
make a word more expansive, for example, we are engaged with an entirely different process. 
Take the instance of trying to make a word more encompassing: Sometimes I will arrive at the 
feeling that I need a new word to better describe what is happening. I feel, right now, that I want 
a word that is more wide-ranging, more capable of describing certain cases with affinities to each 
other but also a broader range of descriptive power, in conjunction with those notions. I want a 
word to describe not just what I think of this man who has neither foresight nor insight nor 
hindsight; I want a word, from within this one moment in time, that will show me what someone 
who has a mix of two of them not only is but who they are at some kind of outset (that is just 
what this lightning-like thought is like here; all it means is I want for it to be more encompassing 




course that even at this next stage this word will still always be confined to its then-moment, but 
at least its new moment here will be one that contains a bit more of other contexts to potentially 
comprise that then-moment rather than just the singular type that spurred it all.) So I come up 
with a new phrase: “fore-hindsight”. It occurs to me just right here that there are cases in the 
foreseeable future that might require more amounts of forward-looking hindsight than hindsight 
which has generally only captured certain gradients of hindsight to keep the lessons for the future 
in mind. (But of course it doesn’t always occur just so. Nonetheless, this is what we are working 
with right now.) It, therefore, seems pertinent to me as it occurs right now that there are cases of 
larger proportion, comprised of more of the gradients that are possible in the form of surrounding 
activities making up the words, that could be in existence (as viewed from this one moment in 
time) and made into something right now that will serve better in future uses for imagined 
contexts. But (the determination of) which contexts still remains somewhat random, in a way. It 
seems that there are feelings we have before context comparison that make it so that we can fit 
them into different contexts, but these feelings, in terms of intensity and amount, appear to be 
more and more arbitrarily constructed the more and more we spread out here.  
To reiterate, sometimes we consider three words together, in relation to one another, and 
we can get clearer on what they mean (in relation to one another), although often only from 
within and for the outcroppings of one instance only. So this means that there are times when the 
comparison of different words for one moment is what has made them clear in that moment. And 
we have also just now seen that the comparisons of words are compared to other times when we 
compared the same or similar words—with each case being different, and answering to different 
contexts, and updating and reupdating over and over again when these new times arise. This 




itself happens in random sets: the context we reach into to compare a set of words to understand 
meaning is a context that comes when these words are compared in this instance—the contexts 
don’t expand back forever into some kind of endless space of time; rather, they are dependent 
upon the “right now” and what this moment here has made of the comparisons of words, some 
instances of which activity will be composed of previous moments in time that held comparisons 
which themselves held comparisons that had only a few of the comparisons of moments already 
passed, which held only certain amounts of other comparisons, and so forth. Where does the line 
stop when we are trying to make a decision about whether a word or words or a word in 
conjunction with or in comparison to other words is just right for this situation here? Each time a 
decision is made when the words come up or are reevaluated and then made different to our 
understandings by the new words. But it seems to be a random process, one that cannot allow us 
to have much active participation in the procedures of deliberation. Especially because 
sometimes we question the fittingness of a word and sometimes we don’t. Another variant of 
these ideas is that the comparison of the words “foresight”, “hindsight”, and “insight” compares 
random contexts of what arises in this moment—the idea of foresight being this way in 
comparison to that one, and so forth. But the comparison of contexts right here of the three 
words contains ideas of times when I compared them before, which itself contained ideas of 
when I compared them before, and so forth, as we just were able to see made clearer above, but 
not always. At certain points some contexts of compared contexts containing compared contexts 
get dropped, and what those points are is not ever predictable. It seems to be random, save for 
what the words tell us, i.e., whatever is coming up in our minds from the words obscures the 
problem of predictability and makes it so that we don’t even consider the problem of having to 




this: Without continual use, so much of the word’s meaning will drop away. If not literally each 
instance of affinity, then a lot of instances of affinity, in fact, will drop away. (IF it were each, 
we would be living in an impossible vacuum of a world.) So how much of each amount of word 
meaning (the idea of “amount” here being derived from how many—or, more often, the feeling 
of how many—of the instances of affinity there are spread across time) will be necessary to 
maintain one meaning of a word? There were times when I compared the use of the words 
“foresight”, “hindsight”, and “insight” before, each time giving me new information about the 
types. But many of those times I was thinking of other times that I compared the three words to 
figure out the use of which to use. And some will not be the same as I thought it to be originally. 
It will only ever be a seemingly random process that makes us know when enough is enough. 
The depth of the feelings is how we determine certain things like when a word is the right one to 
use or when we need another word to describe contexts that don’t seem to fit in with what its 
chain of custody seems to have made it to have going for it—that is, what I would describe right 
now as how much and how deeply we feel these feelings of whether we need more context or not. 
And the depth of the feelings that conspires to make this all happen is still always utterly 
mysterious. Another thing is that I can compare some contexts about when we have compared 
them in contexts, the surroundings of each of the words and how they compare to one another 
not only to fit one of them but to fit one of them and not the other two. This process also includes 
the same things as the last sentence—the surroundings of each of the words and how they 
compare to one another not only to fit one of them but to fit one of them and not the other two, 
and so forth, etc.—but it also includes the idea of having done all that, a set out, as we think of 
it, continuing the ideas of comparing contexts, etc., at other points back in time that had the 




involves duplicates, as an instance of itself comes to be duplicated, as itself.3 As well, the 
feelings that happen before context comparison are feelings that seem, more than anything, at 
least in our thinking about it here, to show us how to feel and consider the arbitrarily connected 
amounts and intensities of feeling spread across time through each moment we felt the ideas and 
feelings (in each other random chain of amounts and intensities stretching ever farther back) 
before. It is according to their depths and intensities that our feelings spur the comparison of 
contexts, which as contexts reaching backwards indefinitely also function in mostly the same 
way.  
In addition, sometimes we try to make words more wide-ranging more naturally, across 
larger amounts of time, rather than just from within one moment of time. This is another 
possibility that involves something like using the fabricated phrase-turned-word “fore-hindsight” 
across multiple instances before doing more comparisons in one moment. This has the effect of, 
for one, obscuring the moments of decision-making that occur when we do happen to struggle to 
find the right word, and feel the need, as a result, to invent a different one. But this multi-use, 
meaning derivative pattern can also have the effect of making it so that newly-constructed words 
that we do find to, even originally, exist outside of a single moment are words that make 
themselves known to us a few times over, creating and setting in motion that chain of affinity, 
those feelings of endless relation, that occur inside of us at the recognition of such occurrences 
(the occurrence being a new word coming up, occurring, in this way). These, to reiterate, are the 
types of situations in which the endless relation feeling brings up the doubling of the feeling of 
“knowing”; that momentary feeling of similarity that makes us feel we know that word, and how 
 
3 Adhering to processes like this in the mind will show us all kinds of occurrences like this that we never 




it is used, again.4 That wholeness that has just arisen right here is another part of the processes 
and existences of the affinities, and how we come to recognize words and their meanings through 
such instances of affinity by feeling certain feelings in manners that are always shifting: 
sometimes doubling, sometimes multiplying and compounding more than twice to set another 
chain of affinities in motion, often doing both at the same time, one right after the other. 
 We should note how this all combines, here, to create an exemplification of what might 
arise from these cases as a more abstract view of what is happening—a larger, more distanced 
view capable of demonstrating the feelings that arise when we attempt to understand how we 
create and feel and imagine, say, infinity, for example, across time and yet remain unable to 
compare different contexts across different moments of each context’s new, needing-to-use-
them-to-compare-to-get-clearer contexts before first feeling some arbitrary set of amounts and 
intensities. Look at the cases from above. The comparison of feelings happens in sets, and those 
comparisons themselves also take on new sets that have themselves new sets, as we have seen, 
but before any such comparisons (of comparisons, of comparisons, and so on forever) take place, 
the first thing that happens is a random arising of a feeling in and as a process that occurs in 
different amounts and intensities each time to connect different contexts under the guise of one 
felt sentiment. We hold many contexts at once, all the while, but they are often random and 
always ever-splitting. Feelings hold random sets of ideas compared across contexts as they are, 
as sets, felt in differing intensities and amounts at different times and so therefore considered to 
either be or not be something, to fit or not to fit criteria, to relate to meanings we knew before, 
 
4 There seem to be, even here, those types of infinite structures which surround how we feel and know. I 
wouldn’t say they are very conducive to words. But then again, I couldn’t say. Yet here: the doubled form of 
knowing is felt as double, but it isn’t always felt with the exact same intensity or exact same amount of that 
kind of doubling. Doublings will always feel different, so the affinities we reach into are coming to make less 
and less sense without such a process that might enable us to be engaged in the activities of fully feeling each 




and a whole host of other types of processes. The feelings are arising to connect not only 
endlessly shifting gradients of feelings of affinity that relate contexts together in meaning and 
sentiment but also to function as those manners of context comparison that happen in accordance 
with what we would consider in the moments they arise to be the contexts that contain 
themselves moments of the same sort, all the way back, if we start with re-tracing the same kind 
of process from the tip of the iceberg where the feelings arise to the backwards set of 
comparisons that contain themselves over and over again, in random ways at different times. 
This, however, is only one, minute possibility. For now, the clearer track is this: Measurement of 
feeling usually happens before or with context comparison to seek the affinities we need to 
categorize. Measurement of feeling is also starting to look like something that trails from 
moment of felt sentiment to moment of felt sentiment across time and space in manners of and in 
the grips of an infinitely splitting architecture of endlessly shifting gradients. Let’s go back to the 
time we compared the use of the words “foresight, hindsight, and insight”. I remember that I 
recently compared these three words. My feeling right now is that the word “insight” is one I use 
in situations where I want to go into things. There is a depth of feeling to that particular 
sentiment itself, one that I can feel myself measuring in my mind as I determine that depth by 
a(nother)5 process of feeling. Depending on the random intensity or amount of the feeling, some 
of the contexts containing the same intensity or amount of the feeling get dropped or picked up 
on. The resulting feeling seems to then unite all the contexts that themselves contain all these 
farther-reaching back contexts of moments when we previously compared things. The under-grid 
of the process, being endlessly-shifting and picking up on some amounts and intensities of felt 
sentiment but not others in different, shading-over-into-one-another ways in different manners at 
 
5 If “another”, one will see how this gets even messier, with different feelings on top of feelings we can barely 




different times, seems like a scaffolding of the infinite sort. Of course, we should remember that 
which contexts are contained in this conglomerate depends entirely on randomness—specifically, 
the randomness of the intensity or amount of the feeling that spurred it in the first place. So the 
process is one that saw me begin by categorizing and finding or even sometimes creating certain 
meaning out of a particular depth of feeling that arises, which I did here only after I engaged in 
some more mysterious process of measuring the intensity or amount of that specific feeling. 
Perhaps since we did do that first part first, looking to cross-context comparison only after 
feeling the mysterious intensity and amount of a particular feeling that has arisen, we actually 
created new things. Soon we will return to this possibility.  
 
b.  
 There is no one single experience that stays the same in all cases of the use of any single word. 
Take the word “hope”: Wittgenstein shows us tangentially that in any case in which we would 
use the word “hope” to describe what we feel, the circumstances surrounding the instance of 
“hope” are not required to look the same—or even have any single aspect in common. For 
instance, if I sit down to write my thoughts down and an idea occurs to me that I have never 
thought of before, I might feel hopeful that I will get somewhere in my thinking today. The hope 
in this situation has come from the aspects surrounding the birth of this particular feeling—the 
sitting down to write, the occurrence of the new idea, and so forth. Does this mean that every 
time in the past that I have felt hope, the same chain of events occurred? And does this mean that 
for me to feel hope again in the future the same chain of events must also occur? The answer to 
this is obviously in the negative, because we can also conceive of infinitely many other cases 




before and I feel hopeful that he will make a full recovery. This feeling of hope in this case is 
one I categorize to be the same as the hope that I felt in the first example, when I sat down to 
write and discovered something interesting. But it is not preceded by the same set of 
circumstances as the first instance; I did not, this time, sit down to write or receive a new idea 
that caused me to feel a certain way. The hope that arose this time had entirely different 
surroundings. So, then, what is the meaning of the word “hope”? Well, one answer is that it has 
infinitely many different meanings, and the entire world of experience is therefore endlessly 
indiscrete beyond us. For example, in order to determine the meaning of the word “hope”, we 
must have to look at each specific occurrence of it to see what preceded, accompanied, and 
followed its coming into being. (I use “hope” in many of the cases where I expected one thing 
and found another. But only in cases in which that expectation was elevated by the finding of 
whatever particular circumstance; not in cases where the expectation was deflated by the 
secondary occurrence.) Likewise, it may also be that it is impossible to give a definition to 
something like “hope” if the feeling arises in each case as disconnected from any common 
surroundings. (The cases where I use “hope” are all, or nearly all, ones in which that initial 
expectation increased upon my arrival to a secondary moment—but they do not all contain the 
same original circumstance, e.g., being worried in this particular way. For there are gradients to 
the circumstances, and infinite varieties to how we feel them, but the similarities of feeling are 
what constitute the instances and use of the words, the sameness what makes the slight feeling of 
connection across time and spaces of use.6) But a second way to look at these specific 
circumstances, and the way that is overall more constitutive of reading (b) here, is to ask whether 
there is indeed still a language game going on in these cases right now that is informing us more 
minutely what the word “hope” means. If there is, it is one that is seemingly different to the type 
 




of language game that occurred within the narrowed part of the building example of (a), where 
the language game entailed the understanding of the naming of an object rather than anything 
else. In some senses, the language game that is occurring here is one that more closely relates to 
the second part of (a), where a different language game arises anew every moment “while others 
are discarded” (Section 23), as well as to (b) in summation. Thus, the focus in this context is 
more on the fact that there is no one thing that stays the same across time when it comes to 
determining the meaning of a word, since the circumstances literally change in each instance, but 
also on that a particular language game could be said to exist of a moment insofar as, inside of 
that, we compare these circumstances within that moment. Wittgenstein especially brings this to 
our attention in part of Section 87 when he tells us that explanations “hang in the air” unless they 
are supported by “[other explanations]”—so “an explanation may indeed rest on another that has 
been given, but none stands in need of another, unless we require it to avoid a 
misunderstanding.” This is important: Explanations may be isolated, but they may also arise in 
service of the explanation, to ourselves, of how we understand what something means in a 
certain context, for instance. Applied in this context, this means that if we try to figure out what 
the meaning of “hope” is when we utter it after finding that our expectations were largely 
exceeded by an occurrence, it is not just the surrounding circumstances we compare and contrast, 
but also the way in which we enter into a new surrounding context to attempt to explain cases to 
ourselves. This is what makes the more immediate, of-a-moment type of language game that 
serves to transform into our second reading: We learn what a word like “hope” means by 
creating new rules to determine what the language game can provide for us as far as context goes 
when we engage in the very act of questioning the use of the word “hope” itself. If I use the word 




that there is only one case in which I can ever have that hope—unless I decide that that is what I 
mean to say, in which case the rules of the game change and now it happens to be that I am quite 
able to utter such a thing and mean it just so. It turns out that I meant that I could only have that 
thought in that particular moment because of that secondary moment itself.  If that second act of 
questioning had not occurred, there would be no way to make this determination, and chances 
are, I would be none the wiser, convinced that the one idea which had occurred to me was the 
only possible one.  
This indicates that there are certain aspects of indiscrete and forever-incomplete 
circumstances surrounding the “nimbus” of our thinking, for one, and a certain type of 
endlessness creating our ability to make precise specifications regarding meanings and uses of 
words, for another. We already began to see this embodied in (a) when the builders needed to 
continually revise what they were prepared to consider the circumstances of their usage of a 
word like “block”, or when they needed to make decisions (whether they realized it or not!) 
about whether they would continue to accept or reject a certain use of a word as correct or 
incorrect. We also saw what might arise as an extension of this infinitely splitting process of 
determination by shaded over sets of feeling. However, here what we see more clearly is that the 
language game of a moment is predicated on the ever shifting creation of new aspects or rules, 
which is more demonstrative, overall, of the last part of this second way of reading we are 
exploring here, where new language games arise across and during each and every instance. In 
Sections 139-142 Wittgenstein’s cube example brings much of this to light.  Section 138 first 
pre-loads 139 by asking questions of ‘fit’: “Can the meaning of a word that I understand fit the 
sense of a sentence that I understand? Or the meaning of one word fit the meaning of another?” 




meaning we have to add of its use in our minds; that is, we seem to have to ask ourselves if the 
meaning of a word can fit another mean of its use. Then we see that our question in some sense 
matches Wittgenstein’s next realization in 138: “Of course, if the meaning is the use we make of 
the word, it makes no sense to speak of such fitting. But we understand the meaning of a word 
when we hear or say it; we grasp the meaning at a stroke, and what we grasp in this way is surely 
something different from the ‘use’ which is extended in time!”. Thus, the use of the word 
constitutes a certain ever shifting structure in which the word makes its meaning, and the 
meanings of what we recognize to be the same word extended across time do not seem to have 
the same structure as any initiatory instance of our coming to know that word in a moment. We 
now have in our minds these questions of fitting when we enter into Section 139, such that 
Wittgenstein’s questioning whether the entire use of the word “cube” comes before someone’s 
mind when mentioned makes us realize that there is no one use extending across time that this 
word could ever fit into anything without destroying the structure of a moment which itself is the 
cause of our coming to understand: “Can what we grasp at a stroke agree with a use, fit or fail to 
fit it? And can what is present to us in an instant, what comes before our mind in an instant, fit a 
use?” Now we intuit that the answer must be no. We already know from our first reading and 
parts of the second certain ideas of how the meaning of a word comes from its use within a 
moment; now we can hold that in our minds and truly come to understand that the structures of 
understanding come only at a moment’s notice and no further. Wittgenstein proceeds to develop 
the point that it is the methods of projection that we use which are the functional aspects of the 
enabling of our determinative understandings of the meaning of a word in any given instance. He 
asks us in 139 to engage with an example where “it is quite easy to imagine a method of 




terms of use. So, for instance, as he shows us, even if we are to think of a picture of a cube when 
someone mentions the word “cube” to us and then proclaim that that is the correct use of the 
term since we would never point to a shape of a different kind and call it a cube, this use of the 
word is not singular in its correctness or incorrectness, for in this example we have chosen a 
method of projection that determines whether it is right or wrong, and in this case, the use is right 
even when it is wrong due to the nature of its surrounding circumstances of occurrence (when we 
project.) To repeat, this particular use of the word cube is not singularly correct or incorrect 
until we project out into the surrounding circumstances to determine what sort of use it was. 
Wittgenstein presses us further in 140, telling us that the effect of this argument is that it “call[s] 
our attention to […] that there are other processes, besides the one we originally thought of, 
which we would sometimes be prepared to call ‘applying the picture of a cube’.” This is 
important: “Our ‘belief that the picture forced a particular application upon us’ consisted in the 
fact that only the one case and no other occurred to us.” This singular, of-a-moment type of 
thinking is what forces us into believing that there must only be one meaning or application of a 
particular word. But many other varieties of application exist—and if, as per Section 142, “[it] is 
only normal cases that the use of a word is laid out for us; we know, are in no doubt, what we 
have to say in this or that case”, then it is the “abnormal cases” that force us to compare and 
contrast surrounding contexts, and it is there that arise similar sets of ideas where we pigeonhole 
ourselves into believing certain things only because these were the only that arose in a certain 
context.  
In terms of our original “hope” example above, it becomes clearer now that, indeed, “new 
language games” do seem to “arise every moment while others are discarded”: When I think 




very questioning of this fact only shows me how my understanding leads to one definitional 
aspect or another, i.e., my language games are always shifting. But we have already begun to see 
exemplified in a closer analysis of the cube example that this is only part of the story, since so 
also must we be aware that every time we try to relate structures (what Wittgenstein calls 
“methods of projection” or “methods of application”) in certain ways, we are forcing their use to 
seem to be something particular in our cognition. Thus, reading (b) might be better encapsulated 
if we aim to sum it up like this: We “choose” to hold onto or discard certain pieces of 
information (explanation, understanding, uses) arbitrarily and in different amounts and ways at 
different moments. Because only one use can occur to us in a moment (until viewed as a later 
understanding of previous circumstance in hindsight), we think that only one use was possible, 
that “a particular application” of a word was “forced upon us.” As far as the building example(s) 
of reading (a) go, meaning still is use here in (b), with our “hope” and “cube” examples, in 
almost exactly the same way that it is in (a)—how a word is used in life and action alongside our 
determinations, accompanying moments of understanding, and instances of choosing to hold 
onto or discard certain pieces of information is what determines its meaning from context, e.g., a 
builder uses the expression “slab!” to indicate that he wants the other builder to bring him a slab 
to the effect that single word used in that particular way means the same thing as “bring me a 
slab!” in a fuller language; and, again, zooming farther out shows us that decisions are made at 
every moment to circumscribe our world, meaning, for instance, that what constitutes a “block” 
must be determined anew every moment, especially when making decisions about meaning from 
use in situations where the conditions that surround “block-determination” are effectively infinite 
and spread far across time. Both of these things are still true within our “hope” example here in 




change, for, as we have seen, no matter what precedes moments where I use the word “hope”, I 
know to use the word when I feel something that is comparatively similar to other times when I 
used it. Thus, the “usage” aspect to the determination of the meaning of a word for (b) is nearly 
identical to the aspect that occurred in (a), but since, so it goes, we have entered our own new 
context, it has slight variation and mainly, as its character of concreteness, just an affinity to the 
notion of “use as meaning”, as such the case was in (b), and which appears to comprise the 
connecting bridge between our two moments of analysis here. In addition, the decision-making 
component of the determination of the use of a word is also the same with the “hope” example 
here as it was in (a) with the blocks. The main affinity between (a) and (b) for this example right 
here is that, just like was the case with our continual reassessment to determine whether when 
new information was added or new avenues were more fully considered something was still, in 
one or even across many instances, a block in (a), our understanding of whether “hope” works in 
a given situation in (b) tends to come from a more unceasingly-revisionist activity the likes of 
which we saw with Wittgenstein’s “cube” example, where overlaying ‘methods of projection’ 
create anew every time what we are prepared to count as the correct use for a term: The language 
games keep shifting when we ask ourselves what we are willing to consider as a correct use of a 
term. That is, even if we have already circumscribed what is relevant to the use of a word before 
we come to use it, a word like “hope” will always be sensitive to more context yet, in the form of 
ever-shifting inquires that continually revise its status in our language games. (For instance, we 
can understand that using the word “cube” to describe an image of a triangular shape would be 
an “incorrect” use of it, but when we revise it to contain the very premise of its incorrectness, it 
becomes the singular use for that moment only, and in that way it is correct.) In fact, the 




deeper, since not only can we be sure that use makes the meaning of a word to the extent that we 
remind ourselves of what we are prepared to count as part of its context—and that the world of 
understanding that serves to accompany the surrounding moments of context is pliable and 
subject to any subsequent moments of understanding—but further also can we frame the 
connection between both readings this way: If everything about a word and its meaning is 
sensitive to context (a), and in some cases we can indeed recognize that our choosing to hold 
onto or discard certain pieces of information is what circumscribes the range of our usage of a 
word (b), are not these two cases truly the same thing, only seen as similar in different contexts? 
It would indeed seem that they are the same—or at least different manifestations of practically 
the same thing. However, the key component of (b) that makes it even more variable than even 
the most infinitely extended zoom-outs of (a), is that, unlike the block examples where the 
context keeps extending farther and farther out, the extensions of context that happen in (b) are 
even more unmoored, since, as per Wittgenstein’s cube example, to ask whether a particular use 
of the word cube is correct requires certain “methods of projection” that complicate matters 
farther by demanding we readjust our own criteria each and every moment to get to the bottom 
of a meaning in a way that never ends even inside of one moment. Section 141 of the 
Investigations allows us to better intuit this crucial extension within the context of the cube 
example: “But what if not just the picture of the cube, but also the method of projection, comes 
before our mind?” he asks us. In order to imagine this, “perhaps” we see “before” us “a schema 
showing the method of projection: say, a picture of two cubes connected by lines of projection. 
[…] Can’t I now imagine different applications of this schema too? – Well, yes, but can’t an 
application come before my mind? It can: only we need to become clearer about our application 




context, the ideas that this section bring to mind complement the extensions of context which 
have occurred throughout (b) in two crucial ways. First, 141 shows us that the idea of a “method 
of projection” is one that enables us to see, as we already have, that a picture on its own (in our 
less visually-inclined case, a word either before or after it takes on a picture in our minds) stands 
in need a method of application in order for it to be deemed correct or incorrect in use. So, it is 
possible to look at a picture of a triangular prism and find similarities between it and a picture of 
a cube and the use of the word cube will therefore vary in its correctness depending on how and 
when we use it. But second, the idea of application is its own application, which has implications 
that are much more far-reaching than it might at first appear. What I mean is that if we follow 
Wittgenstein and try to figure out how this schema in our minds is an application of what we 
were thinking about, we would need to be figuring out at every single moment along the line 
which application was at play, and we will forever stand in need of a new application to 
determine the relationship between different applications that come up in different, infinitely-
splitting gradients. Of course, as 141 informs us, we have to reckon first and foremost with the 
use (and application!) of the very phrase “the application came before our mind”. How, we might 
ask, if that’s true, is it the case that we used that phrase here, to describe or think about what we 
were doing? We could imagine this fuller questioning process to go like this: Is this the correct 
use of the method of application?, I ask myself when trying to wrap my mind around whether 
Wittgenstein’s visual representation of a method of application of a cube is the right use of the 
phrase “method of application”, either for my purposes before the fact or for what results 
afterwards when I supposedly know more about the situation. Well, only if that use right there is 
the right application of the phrase “method of application”. And that itself will stand in need of a 




Which then also needs to be anchored to a new application to explain that one, and so on forever. 
We see that sometimes the cube and the methods of projection come before our minds; 
sometimes they are isolated. What anchors us to one categorization versus the other? A subtle 
shift in feeling, one of the vast infinite gradients of possibility. The amounts and intensities of 
what we can feel are always changing place to place, shifting seconds upon seconds. Each time, 
if we pay close enough attention, there are subtle differences, certain sums anchored by the 
feelings that arise and that spread out context to context (grabbing other contexts in arbitrary 
amounts) based on how deeply we feel one versus the other, or even how deeply we feel the 
apparently same method of projection across time. The feelings shift on amount and intensity; 
but the shifting is random, if we notice, and especially if we try to grab more context, we will be 
lost in arbitrarily collected sums of different ones—all filtered through feeling. The infinite 
architecture of thinking here—indeed, the infinitely splitting architecture of the processes of ever 
shifting splits of context and/or feelings-based context comparison—is arising as increasingly 
connected to some under-grid of feeling that we cannot have access to without appealing to a 
process of thinking meant to highlight and go deeply into the ever splitting physical nature of 
how, in fact, these thoughts may arise.  
Any check I perform to verify my own use of a word in any given circumstance will, 
itself, be subject to another mental occurrence of verification that stands in need of another 
arbitrary mental occurrence of verification, and so on ad infinitum. Section #2 will really get into 
this, but for now we can advance summarily by making sure we understand the oddity of what 
this brings up. Because a question now arises. How do we ever know how to use a word? Part (a) 
and (b) above have shown us different ways, but clearly, something is still missing from our 




of application” create utter chaos even when we don’t necessarily try to pull their usages apart 
but instead, really, just try to sit with them as they arise in our minds. Wittgenstein himself knew 
he could never figure out the what behind what we tap into when we think about this kind of 
question. Perhaps the areas below the abstraction necessarily cannot be known. Yet, in my mind, 
something else comes up now that does have important implications for more than just our use of 
words or our understanding of words’ meanings. The infinite questioning that comes along with 
Wittgenstein’s investigations of the endless uses of method of application even within one 
instance of our cognition, combined with (b)’s gesture to the notion that whenever we use the 
same word like “hope” across multiple situations, there is almost never anything that is the same 
in the surroundings that led up to it, conspire to create this more pressing idea in our minds right 
now: If we are always half-guessing at what a situation or a thought or a feeling really is or really 
feels like (whether we know it or not), how can we ever say anything about what we feel (or just 
anything at all) with certainty?  It is possible that these “deeper layers” of our psychology do not 
amount to much in day to day living. But it seems worth it to consider how we ever do acquire 
the feeling of similarity between different usages of words and their corresponding mental states 
if in every single case there will always be slight variations and nothing more than affinities to 
anchor us to one particular state of mind versus another. When we consider such cases as those 
that are more manifestly psychological, the implications of this part of the investigation here 
become even clearer. Section #2 will discuss this in depth, especially in its latter half when what 
I refer to often as the infinitely splitting architecture of our ever shifting processes of thinking 
and feeling begins itself to infinitely split open under the pressure of an attack on its own 
processes using its own processes. How do we know what we feel?, is one question that can 




to answer it, but we will keep it in mind as one potential background for investigation as we 
carry ever-forward across moments of time.  
In summary, (a) began to show us how to constitute the first reading of the Investigations 
when we viewed narrow language games as the primary method by which we determine the 
meaning of a word. We saw further how a word or a phrase cannot be isolated from its 
surroundings if we are to determine its meaning in a particular instance of use, e.g., “slab!” in a 
more limited language means the same thing as “bring me a slab!” in a less limited language 
because its use is the same and the surrounding context is similar enough to be categorized in 
common during our moments of understanding. Then, we zoomed-out into other situations that 
dealt more extensively with cases where moments of understanding contained accompanying 
circumstances for the builders that sometimes carried across time to different effect. In this same 
thought-space it became clear that decisions often have to be made every moment in order to 
determine the meaning of a word, even if it may seem to a builder in one certain instance like a 
particular word such as “block” goes back to a specific moment of ostensive determination. (It 
may even be the case that an initial moment of determination of the meaning of a word like 
“block”, carried as it sometimes is across time, actually masks the uncertain nature of any 
subsequent follow-ups regarding the original meaning of the word, to the extent that re-affirming 
the use of the word at every single moment—deciding, that is, to accept or reject it at every new 
instance—is a property of thinking and understanding that remains hidden to the builders, 
obscured by the feeling that contextual similarity is on full power and always has been.) At the 
end of (a) we also saw that context comparison across time depends on the feelings that arise in 
each instance and that each of these instances, comprised separately of differing sets of 




depending on how the feelings hold onto the multiple instances in each set of thinking (about 
thinking, about feeling, etc.). I hinted, one, that this messiness of process leads into an under-grid 
of ever shifting processes itself, and, two, that in some of these cases, cases when the feelings in 
different intensities and amounts (of sets of context, or just different amounts in general) come 
before context comparison (even in cases where context comparison itself has spread back 
forever randomly into its own sets of randomly felt and accordingly grouped information about 
feeling and meaning), we are actually engaged in a mysterious creation of feelings—a surprising 
pull of the thread that will be addressed more soon. Reading (b) took us farther down into the 
rabbit hole to see that the circumstances in which we use a word like “hope” are never required 
to have much in common with one another, much less any single thing. Wittgenstein’s 
conviction that often new language games arise and are discarded literally every single moment 
eventually corresponded to our consideration of “methods of projection” in his cube example, 
where it became increasingly evident that self-reflection on our own usage of each phrase as we 
try to explain different methods of application within certain methods of application themselves 
causes the context to continually split even farther at every moment (and at many moments we 
don’t even seem to know exist but which do when we create them out of necessity in 
explanation!). Readings (a) and (b) continued throughout to have more in common than not: For 
one thing, it seems always to be context that determines the meaning of a word, whether one is a 
builder engaged in circumstance-sensitive definitional aspects predicated on ostensive 
maneuvers that accompanied his moments of coming to understand or whether one is, instead, a 
person involved in the business of understanding the use of a word like “hope” correctly across 
several of his moments. For another, both the activity of pinpointing the correct use of the word 




same puzzle, depending how we look at circumstance; for instance, in (a), the builders 
sometimes had to assess at every single moment whether their use of the word was fitting enough 
to their purposes, and in (b), there were plenty of moments in the “hope” example and the “cube” 
example where we had to continually revise what we were prepared to count as the correct use of 
a word as language games dropped in and out anew every single moment. Yet the cube example 
of reading (b) made it much clearer that Wittgenstein’s “methods of projection” create a sense of 
infinity even within one moment in time, since methods of application require endless 
reevaluation, qualification, and updating, with the consequence that understanding what we 
actually feel at any given point is a nearly impossible task. This only reaffirms what (a) showed 
us about the nearly infinite varieties of feeling and depths or intensities of that feeling that arise 
during adherence to certain, possibly-derived-from-the-infinitely-splitting architecture-of-the-
ever-shifting-processes-of-thought processes of continual context comparison. The feelings are 















Before shifting into full psychological gear, Wittgenstein first kicks us into combinatory 
territory: Thinking about and with the processes of understanding which occur when we try to 
understand not just understanding itself but also how we feel. The activities we use are activities 
which take us deep into the realm of understanding the feelings (of feelings, of thoughts, of 
feelings of thoughts) that link up in our minds. Section 640 points this out nicely for us: “‘This 
thought links up with thoughts which I have had before.’ –How does it do so? Through the 
feeling of such a link? But how can a feeling really link these thoughts? —The word ‘feeling’ is 
very misleading here. But it is sometimes possible to say with certainty, ‘This thought is 
connected with those earlier ones’, even though one is unable to point out the connection. 
Perhaps one will succeed later.” In other words, sometimes there is a feeling that we can connect 
two thoughts together through a feeling. But only when we use the word ‘feeling’ to describe 
that process. In other cases, if we do not use the word ‘feeling’, we will not arrive at the same 
type of idea that there is some kind of feeling that connects two random thoughts to each other. 
The whole of it feels very random. And not only that, but so also does it become clear that to say 
“sometimes there is a feeling that we can connect two thoughts together” is a very different 
occurrence to “sometimes there is a feeling that we can connect two thoughts together through a 
feeling. The latter seems to exist on two levels simultaneously, while the former instead limits 
itself to the one layer. Saying that we can have a feeling about connecting a thoughts through 
feelings is, in this case, more reminiscent of the sentence “we can have a feeling about 
connecting the feelings between thoughts” than it is the sentence “we can have a feeling about 




Regardless, this is a very particular occurrence; it will not be the same ever again as time moves 
by.  
For now, Wittgenstein’s considerations seem to tell us more about stopping processes 
than starting them; that is: The identification of particular occurrences of processing mental 
processes from potential others. Section 322 picks up on this when it discusses the idea of 
comparison, broadly speaking, in conjunction with the processes of understanding the idea of 
understanding: “The question what the expression means is not answered by such a description; 
and this tempts us to conclude that understanding is a specific, indefinable experience. But one 
forgets that the question which should be our concern is: how do we compare these experiences; 
what criterion of identity do we stipulate for their occurrence?”.  In other words, in order to 
understand how we understand, we have to compare the comparisons of the criterion of identity 
that, in a sense, we stipulate will occur. This reason for this might be because, in many cases, we 
cannot understand the meaning of the process or activity of understanding without first trying to 
understand the process that refers to understanding what a process is. Section 366 tells us that a 
process in the mind could never be said perfectly to correspond to any such occurrence of a 
process on, for example, paper—there is no such thing as the idea of a process being exclusively 
physical: “‘This process in the mind corresponds to this process on paper.’ And then it would 
make sense to talk of a method of projection according to which the mental image of the sign 
was a representation of the sign itself.” So, carrying that over, our attempts to understand what a 
process is, i.e., trying to understand how we understand, and elucidating what processes we 
understand those processes of understanding with, will, as processes themselves, have wrapped 




the original creation of the process of processing processes is what created its output—it 
necessarily converged upon the process of processing that wanted a process about itself.  
If thinking is not some extra set out that goes beyond the current moment, why do I keep 
referring to “set outs” that keep going beyond the moments? Because in some senses, these 
thoughts about this kind of thinking exist. In some senses, that is, there is a way in which we can 
say that how we know things relate to each other is that they relate to each other across 
moments. But they do not always do such a thing. Yet, when they should so happen to arise in a 
particular moment, they follow that same sort of process. Wittgenstein seemed to intuit the fuzzy 
nebula of uncertain, multi-part, almost quantum-in-their-indeterminacy surroundings from which 
our thoughts arise—the type of haze that seems, especially, to come up when we think about 
thoughts that have already apparently been passed by us in time, from within the confines of one 
moment. In some ways, it makes sense that a singular feeling is all we ever have, regardless of 
whatever collected shift of amount and intensity we think it could within itself across summed 
moments contain. But if we push the ideas farther, moving on as we do towards more hyper-sets 
of feelings, we will start to see emerge from within the confines of what in fact we are engaged 
in just right now a certain sense of the infinite architecture of an infinite under-grid of ever-
shifting processes of feelings. Using that process, which has been created from this sentiment 
right now in time in a manner that traces itself back to the end of part (a) in #1, will enable us to 
peer into that physical land that creates our feelings and conceptions through random sets of 








In this section, I turn to Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology Fragment to draw out the 
messiness and mysteriousness of the depths of our feelings as they spread across time. In 
attempting to further understand ideas of understanding, seeing as different forms of seeing as, or 
even feeling as through different methods of feeling as, we will see that feelings across time 
become harder to comprehend for the vast variety of their infinitely splitting gradients. Finally, 
when I turn towards the infinite architecture of the under-grid of our ever shifting processes of 
thinking and sentiments, the true depths to which this process of feeling can take us will reveal 
that the amounts and intensities of the feelings that arise across time are implicated at levels we 
can barely even from one singular reference in space and time imagine.  
In Philosophy of Psychology—A Fragment [previously known as ‘Part II’], Wittgenstein 
advances the notion of hyperflexible, context-sensitive linguistic content as being the primary 
method for philosophical knowledge acquisition, this time with an eye towards the psychological 
aspects of language (or, rather, with an eye towards the language that creates the psychological 
aspects we encounter in our daily lives.) The conceptual nature of psychological phenomena is 
such that, according to Wittgenstein, an analysis of psychology is really an analysis of the 
content of our attitudes towards certain feelings and methods of life. These are the attitudes that 
arise from the ways in which our language interacts with context and is created from within the 
confines of each moment of linguistic occurrence. For instance, “describing my state of mind (of, 
say, fear) is something I do in a particular context”, but “is it so surprising that I use the same 
expression in different games? And sometimes, as it were, even in between the games?” (79). 
For Wittgenstein, the description of a state of mind is something that occurs purely linguistically. 




mental conceptions in order to discover any hidden information in the depths below the language 
or the grammar. Rather, each word we use to describe one of our psychological states functions 
in the exact same way as we saw words function in section #1: It is impossible for any words 
uttered with the expectation or hope of introspection to be founded on anything more than a 
fleeting moment; whatever it is that one feels at a given time or another is what he feels within 
that space of time only, and no amount of intentional reflection can change that fact, because the 
feelings that would arise with an intentional check-back on oneself are necessarily new feelings, 
feelings which have arisen in conjunction with the intentions rather than separate to them. (“How 
do I find the ‘right’ word? How do I choose among words? It is indeed as if sometimes I were 
comparing them by fine differences of smell: That is too…that is too…this is the right one. – But 
I don’t always have to judge, explain; often I might only say ‘It simply isn’t right yet.’ I am 
dissatisfied, I go on looking. At last a word comes: ‘That’s it! Sometimes I can say why. That is 
simply what searching, that is what finding, is like here’” (295).) In other words, an intention to 
go backwards in time to consider what is happening and whether our word was accurate enough 
to describe the state we felt is a type of intention that is necessarily confined to its own moment 
in time, a moment which has afforded to it naught but the content of the current state of our 
linguistic existence, which happens to sometimes back-reflect but often does not (and the 
accompanying feelings of one back-reflection that feels capable of and enough for changing our 
minds about something are always different depending on their circumstances, because we—
again, necessarily—cannot feel anything outside of a bounded moment in time.) 
An example of this intentional backtracking on feelings would be if someone decided, in 
a bounded moment, to reconsider his use of the word “clarity” to describe his mental state. “I’m 




two key factors about what else is going on in my experience: I now know new information 
about the situation that makes me question what I originally thought; and now that I know how 
to conceive of this new information as what is causing me to think that I was incorrect before, I 
feel even hazier about it all than even all the middles in between.” One thing happening here is, 
indeed, that he is comparing endless gradients of feelings, from within the connections across 
time that have made him feel what he has felt. (A curious mix of the infinity and the bounding, 
as they were, seems to happen here; the process takes on the feeling of those two things in some 
kind and form of their mixing.) But second, he is thinking about his thinking, and feeling as the 
feelings of his own feelings as in order to grab the nonlinear flow of the (outer) foundations of 
his mind. (Additionally, the fast pace of his mental conceptions is outside of his control, because 
of the nonlinear nature of what is arising.) How he views his own viewing is going to affect the 
gradients that come to view in his light. In the specifics of this case here, this means that his 
intention to view his sense of clarity as something that is now hazy because of two now known 
reasons is an intention that may not or may not have arisen, depending upon precisely how it is 
that the deliberation about the correctness of the use of the word clarity to describe what he felt 
delivers the linguistic content to this particular experience. In one sense, had he never submerged 
his mind to different aspects of the feeling across time, his intention would have disappeared in 
its current moment; but whatever connected himself to that one moment was what made him feel 
that he knew, in the new moment, that ‘clarity’ required some revision if it was to be an accurate 
description of the old moment. So even if he realized that he had no idea how it was the case that 
he arrived upon the feeling that his intention was incorrect, it would still have arisen. But, on the 
opposite end, if he did submerge his mind to the different aspects of the feeling across time, 




happen is that he would possibly feel that the intention was a warranted one, and totally correct, 
but later on, his idea of the fittingness of the revised description of his own description about 
what he is doing is going to seem less fitting than before. Thus, the infinite and arbitrary varieties 
of what he can feel.  
But what about the slightly simpler idea that there could be an overarching summation of 
feelings that combines in our minds to help tell us of multiple moments and occurrences which 
are not confined to the one moment?  Unfortunately, Wittgenstein would dismiss such an idea, 
not least of all on the grounds that it will still always be the case that every moment brings new 
arbitrarily coupled or decoupled information to light by virtue of its arrival through linguistic 
content (or thought-based linguistic content.) What is meant by this for this situation right now is 
that, returning to the example above, of trying to find the right word, what happens here is that 
we do not actually end up knowing what is happening aside from all that occurs specifically here 
because even if we can think backwards in time, each instance of thinking backwards in time will 
end up carrying its own arbitrary set of ‘summed feelings’ taking on a new type of feeling. For 
example, when in certain cases we go on thinking about whether we have chosen the right word 
to describe our feelings or rather not, sometimes it will be the case that the searching brings up a 
new place of thought-content tied to linguistic-markers that enable us to (think we can) change 
our minds about what we have felt, but in many other cases we will not feel as though whatever 
form of searching we engaged in has brought that up, and so we will resign ourselves to 
assuming any previously-felt feeling or idea was definitively the case and all-along not 
something susceptible to change. This process is relatively intuitive because on a moment-to-
moment basis we oftentimes do happen to understand that we are unable to know what we really 




creating our feelings. (That is, it often arises, within the confines of one moment, to be the case 
that we happen to think we need the hyperflexible process of understanding the creation of 
feelings to truly understand a state of mental occurrence---but we don’t always happen to be 
urged by such convictions, or happen to add such convictions back onto our knowledge of our 
thinking about what could account for the case, and also it seems likely that the specific 
gradients of the assurances and feelings here will literally always be different, something we see 
clearly if we pay close enough attention. And now, with this, we have just arrived at our first 
example of how the acquisition of knowledge itself is predicated on this layered process of 
confined, but also infinitely context-sensitive, understandings of what we are attempting to 
understand. To be sure, understanding this mental occurrence happens in its own infinitely 
varied methods of occurrence; intriguingly, we have also now come upon the idea that 
understanding how we understand in infinitely variable ways that we understand understanding 
mental occurrence through infinitely different methods of (understanding the idea of 
understanding that we understand the infinitely varied ways to understand the infinitely different 
understandings of infinitely varied ways of understanding the infinitely varied understandings of 
the infinitely varied ways of understanding the infinitely varied ways of understanding the 
infinitely varied ways of understanding the infinitely varied ways of understanding, [and so forth 
down forever and ever, each time and occurrence of ‘the infinitely varied ways of understanding’ 
being actually literally a different mental occurrence and—I promise—not just a useless 
repetition included here for no reason], the understanding of)7 infinitely varied understandings 
 
7 Each time this literally is very different: We can think backwards in an infinitely-processing cycle. We can 
also understand now that what Wittgenstein is doing by thinking around the context and seeing that each 
time is different is actually opening up a larger realm of contexts that paradoxically bound us when thinking. 
There is a weirdly mathematical structure taking place behind our thoughts, a structure I seem to refer to as 
“the infinite architecture of the ever shifting process of our thoughts”, a structure, indeed, that lives behind 
these sentiments and makes these sentiments arise in the varied ways of existence that we are now 




of understanding the infinitely varied ways of understanding itself8 is a hyperflexible mental 
occurrence like all others—sometimes comprised of endless think-backs of some sort similar to 
the above and which happened to reach those certain understandings starting from one moment 
(though hardly ever! I just started with the first most idealistic of thoughts that has arisen here) 
but usually comprised more of a confined moment of randomly grouped and mixed ideas that 
tells us of certain layers to this understanding in arbitrary or at least specific types of ways (i.e., 
1, the grouping of those infinite variations of understanding the infinite variations of 
understanding will (themselves, in their infinitely varied sets) be one or less in many cases, but 2, 
our understanding of that understanding contains, in some cases, this and that but not, always, 
that and that and this; and some of those ‘this’es and ‘thats’s will be the idea that how we 
understand knowledge is a form of knowledge about understanding and the methods we use to 
coalesce certain features into understanding, and some will be the idea that how we understand 
knowledge is a form of knowledge about understanding without coalescing it all back, to take 
one example, but lots of others will not be just like so.) What we wish to make of this may itself 
be varied—usually the mental phenomena are much more confined to our understanding of and 
existing themselves as within one layer—but the infinite process of set-ups that is possible 
should be starting to come to light a little more.) But perhaps the key takeaway of this process 
here, if we backtrack a little bit right now, is that there is no such thing as a singular “type” of 
back-thinking, or searching, that goes on in all cases across time. Sometimes searching consists 
in recalling pervious states of mind (and in arbitrary manners and amounts); sometimes the 
 
occurrences in space and time of our thoughts; but oftentimes it will instead be the case that thinking about 
thinking is still only ever one thing—usually it is, in fact. In addition, this process of “what arises to be the 
case can arise to be the case in infinitely varied ways can itself be arising in infinitely varied ways” can itself 
arise in infinitely varied way.  




“searching” we think of as, well, “searching”9 is quite simply only that which we end up 
understanding it to be ultimately, i.e., the feeling of recollection bringing up only one of the 
infinite gradients of feelings is only whatever it is during the moment of searching, and nothing 
more, or the feeling of recollection bringing up several or more feelings with only the final 
feeling being the one we focus on becomes whatever it is during those moments of searching.  
More than this, Wittgenstein helps us in quite varied ways to feel even more deeply and 
even sometimes know almost visually that what we call ‘feelings’ consists in infinite varieties 
and gradients of “also feelings”; Section 66: “A ‘feeling’ has for us a quite particular interest. 
And that involves, for instance, the ‘degree of intensity of the feeling’, its ‘location’, and the 
extent to which one feeling can be submerged by another. (When a movement is very painful, so 
that the pain submerges every other slight sensation in the same place, does this make it 
uncertain whether you have really made this movement? Could it lead you to make sure by 
looking?).” Here what is striking is that, indeed, one feeling can be submerged by another, and 
that happens all the time, in different extents always, never in one specific way. Basically, being 
afraid means whatever it comes to be when it arises in whatever context. The surrounding 
situation is what causes it to arise as whatever psychological phenomena it is and is also what 
defines what being afraid means in each instance of its use. (“That’s what I mean by telling you I 
am afraid” is a sentence which covers an infinite assortment of different cases; sometimes I feel 
as though what I felt was that endless fear, at that point, but other times, I most certainly do not 
feel that way. Sometimes I end up feeling as though I am seeing the case as though I feel 
 
9 How did we do that, though? How can we think of searching as something, as anything, if it is always 
changing across time? It arose, but we make sense of it how? What cases are we actually comparing in our 
minds to understand the context-dependent nature of the use of a word? There is still some room for 
mystery, in my mind, the likes of which can only be addressed by something that extends into a physical 
connection across space and time more deeply than one Wittgenstein, or even myself, here, would be 




endlessly deep fear, and so forth; sometimes I end up feeling as though that is not the case, or 
instead that I am feeling it, but not with any as though attached.10 An example of this might arise 
when we think about a particular case of looking backwards on feeling fear: It might occur to me 
in a moment that I should describe my state of fearfulness as one based on being afraid of certain 
outcomes; but then I think back and say, wait a minute, I’m not afraid of certain outcomes so 
much as seeing a fear of the potential for certain outcomes as something that seems to exist in 
certain moments, or maybe it’s actually more the feeling of the feelings of deeper feelings—that 
is to say, the idea that there could exist a deeper feeling I do not understand because of this 
bounded moment that I am afraid of and that obscures the original fear. In this way, I can 
imagine that my own imagining is changing what I feel to be the case. In this way too it becomes 
possible to say something similar to that my deep fear I am thinking back on is not actually a fear 
but rather an endless hopefulness, because in light of the context of the new back-think, I now 
feel instead that to have this fear is something profoundly beautiful and infinitely just whatever it 
is. In some cases, that is, I might be overwhelmingly glad that all the care in the world has 
exhibited itself in my mind and so then, also, filled with love for all that all moments can be.  
So sometimes I feel as though what I felt was that endless hopefulness, at that point; but 
other times I most certainly do not feel that way, and each time I do this type of consideration I 
get farther and farther away from what was the case. Before considering how and why this even 
matters, it might be helpful to take a look at a somewhat odd example, an example that is both 
painful and illuminating at the same time as it seems unable to fully track with what we are 
investigating here. But let’s just trust, for now, that it does, before turning to another example 
that will pull more of all of this intensely spreading investigation together.  
 




How does one make the determination that what he felt at a particular moment was, to 
take a random case, extreme care for something? We would have to start by recognizing that the 
very process of creating feelings includes, and often presumes, hyperflexible consideration. (As 
much as we may also be tempted to examine this issue under the guise that, perhaps, the 
fundamental and possibly metaphysical underpinnings of phenomenal occurrences create 
something that is hyperflexible itself—to the extent that, somehow, as an example, I might be 
able to share with myself, across time, certain feelings in such a way that these feelings literally 
continue to be whatever they first were, in an action-at-a-distance, physical way—a primary look 
at this one particular possibility yields the following warning, to be compounded by the 
outcomes of the second look: Even if it were the case that reality were hyperflexible and capable 
of reaching across moments in any sort of literal way, the outcrop of what “we” feel as what we 
are is nothing more than the language that arises, which (for better or for worse) is confined to 
whatever comes up to create us in the moment. The level of submerging of feelings that occurs in 
these particular cases seems to occur on a different level, a level that exists a set up from its 
original position, rather than one that is on the same even playing field with what is happening 
on the supposed sub-phenomenal plane—meaning that the feelings cannot connect across time in 
any way that would rid us of the importance of our investigation of pro-phenomenal experience. 
A second glance at this vision of reality here is the look that also shows us that, in fact, any word 
I grab onto to explain the underpinnings of a certain physical occurrence (e.g., what happens 
with, in, or creating literally any example from above of using a word to explain a state of 
reality, mind, etc.) will be a word that necessarily connects these physical states, but only on a 
pro-, and not sub-, phenomenal level. It will never, that is, be the case that the sub-phenomenal 
occurrences are happenings which are able to subsume their pro-phenomenal counterparts.)11 
 




(The connection here between the mental and physical goes even deeper, getting more and more 
specific as it spirals down. “Going backwards” in thought happens in layers upon layers upon 
layers, especially in cases where we try to match our experiences with what we tend to think of 
as physiological aspects of occurrence (either in the ways outlined above or in new, farther-
reaching or more confined ways): In section 236, Wittgenstein asks us to “imagine a 
physiological explanation of [an] experience” of looking at a figure, say, a randomly drawn 
figure that hits us with an experience of something that deviates from what we expected in 
certain ways. (It could, for instance, deviate with how we choose to see it, in a particular case; 
perhaps we tell ourselves that we are seeing the figure as this even though we know it is 
something else, or perhaps we do the same thing of seeing it as something but without the even 
though we know aspect, in the rare case that that could be possible by virtue of our newfound 
knowledge at a later moment causing us to realize what we did not realize at the exact specific 
time of our original experience.) If, however, we look to make our experience of seeing the 
figure correspond to a “physiological occurrence”, we might, he explains, describe what is 
happening as composed of certain “oscillations” of the eye, or certain pathways taken that 
 
although I must confess that I found myself drawn to it only after formulating the ideas in these last few 
sentences, and, as such, the connection between the two is as justified as this new moment of thinking can 
propose it to be: “A hypothesis, such as that such-and-such goes on in our bodies when we talk silently to 
ourselves, is of interest to us only in that it points to a possible use of the expression ‘I said…to myself’: 
namely, that of inferring the physiological process from the expression.” Here we can see parallels between 
the idea of sub-phenomenal activity and pro-phenomenal activity such as I was discussing in the above 
context and Wittgenstein’s pointed attention to ‘physiological processes’; the process beneath whatever 
phrase we use to describe a moment is one that is, on a certain level, more flexible when we engage in games 
which are trying to explain how we use language to mean things. Beyond that, we can say nothing. Similarly, 
when we try to say something about the sub-phenomenal occurrences of what is happening, such as 
attempting to venture a guess that sub-phenomenal occurrences can connect across time in such a way as to 
deliver to our current feelings the literally same feelings we had at another point in time, we end up violating 
what it is actually possible to say when it comes to these avenues of thought. The key here is that we cannot 
ignore all of the layers to what we are in fact doing right now. If we do, we do a disservice to Wittgenstein’s 
profound contribution to our understanding of the deepest facets of who and how we are. We might in the 
course of such events get stuck, quite like he seems to often have; it is hard work to continually reject 
certainty and maintain an argument at the same time. But it can be done, especially with more manifestly 




alternate our vision in certain ways, or whatever we want to choose from a great many 
possibilities. And when we explain “seeing as” in this physiological way, and if we then fit this 
knowledge with our knowledge that such movements of the eye are “impossible”, we come to 
view the concept of “seeing as” as one that is composed of different ways in which we can see as 
the seeing as. So: We now know that seeing as in this one particular way in which we see the 
seeing as as type of seeing as is one form of explanation but cannot be all the forms of it. 
Importantly, as Wittgenstein tells us, the psychological explanation in this case “hangs out of 
reach”—which itself points to the fact that the main sum of this parenthetical is yet another 
bundle of reasons for the specificity of the realm of psychological content being tied only to the 
particular risings of pro-phenomenal linguistic content.) All the physical musings aside: If we 
assume that looking backwards onto occurrences of feeling are part and parcel of the creation of 
some manifestations of what we feel (as we should if we follow Wittgenstein’s advice in section 
279 to recall that “that first judgement” of what word is correct as a description of a state of 
occurrence “is not the end of the matter, for it is the field of a word that is decisive”), then we 
have to acknowledge that to guess whether one has felt extreme care at a certain moment for or 
as a certain experience is to often both feel and guess, and that depending on which method 
happens to be felt more deeply, that is how one will judge the situation. So, he wants to know 
whether he can categorize his mental state as one of extreme care or not. Can he say, ‘I told 
myself to feel, not speak, during my moment of intense care, so it must be true that to feel deeply 
is to discourage the use of words?’ Clearly, he knows that is not true in this case. The feelings he 
has, in this case, tend to form a certain “set in the mind” which enable him to utilize the specific 




they will leave him feeling as though his original assertion about his feeling is a type of thinking 
about thinking that has obscured the original intent of his decided-upon mental operations.  
Let’s return to the example from above of understanding how we understand, where we 
said that: “[…] understanding this mental occurrence happens in its own infinitely varied 
methods of occurrence; and, intriguingly, that in doing this understanding we have also now 
come upon the idea that understanding how we understand in infinitely variable ways that we 
understand understanding mental occurrence through infinitely different methods of 
(understanding the idea of understanding that we understand the infinitely varied ways to 
understand the infinitely different understandings of infinitely varied ways of understanding the 
infinitely varied understandings of the infinitely varied ways of understanding the infinitely 
varied ways of understanding the infinitely varied ways of understanding the infinitely varied 
ways of understanding, [and so forth down forever and ever, each time and occurrence of ‘the 
infinitely varied ways of understanding’ being actually literally a different mental occurrence 
and—I promise—not just a useless repetition included here for no reason], the understanding 
of)12 infinitely varied understandings of understanding the infinitely varied ways of 
understanding itself13 is a hyperflexible mental occurrence like all others.” What have we even 
said by saying this? It doesn’t seem like much. It seems, rather, that all we have done is to have 
 
12 It is worth repeating the note here with the repetition of the example. Each time this literally is very 
different: We can think backwards in an infinitely-processing cycle. We can also understand now that what 
Wittgenstein is doing by thinking around the context and seeing that each time is different is actually opening 
up a larger realm of contexts that paradoxically bound us when thinking. There is a weirdly mathematical 
structure taking place behind our thoughts, a structure I seem to refer to as “the infinite architecture of the 
ever shifting process of our thoughts”, a structure, indeed, that lives behind these sentiments and makes these 
sentiments arise in the varied ways of existence that we are now investigating. In this way, a thought about 
thinking is sometimes a thought about many forms and occurrences in space and time of our thoughts; but 
oftentimes it will instead be the case that thinking about thinking is still only ever one thing—usually it is, in 
fact. In addition, this process of “what arises to be the case can arise to be the case in infinitely varied ways 
can itself be arising in infinitely varied ways” can itself arise in infinitely varied way.  





made it so that the idea of understanding an understanding of something is extended forever 
down and down, made into a viciously infinite cycle of endless regression. In some sense, sure. 
But that is just how we have understood it here. Perhaps if we want to try to go beyond what 
Wittgenstein was comfortable expressing, we have to look into the surrounding context of the 
contexts he was pulling from—reach into the surrounding world that arises each moment when 
we engage with these thoughts to see where they themselves are coming from. What does this 
mean? Well, for one, the infinite architecture of the ever splitting processes of our sentiments is 
staring to open up. But, for another, infinity surrounds and creates our feelings, and infinity is 
not, despite how we sometimes think of it, unitary in any sense of the word. We must also 
remember to try to feel the endless gradients and shifts between all the words we use more than 
usual, because if they are taken too literally, they will be bounding us before we even have the 
chance to begin. So when I say: Understanding how we understand in infinitely variable ways 
that we understand understanding in infinitely variable ways is itself an isolated piece of 
knowledge which must be reconciled to the idea that, also, it itself is an infinitely varied 
occurrence in terms of the surroundings in which it will arise, how we come to (in various ways) 
understand it, etc., it seems like we are just repeating certain things that now can come to a full 
stop, be called “nonsensical” because of the dissolution to infinity, and be dismissed on any such 
number of grounds of irrationality. But think about it a little longer. We now have another form 
of isolated knowledge which must be reconciled to the fact that it has to, first and foremost, be 
reconciled to the fact that it can come up in any number of ways. [We could easily envision a 
world where no such extra reconciliation were even possible; but that is a whole other story.] 
And now we have another form of apparently isolated knowledge, by virtue of the fact that time 




conceptions make us believe it is, by the reason that they have to be that way to grab onto 
anything ever, then we could ignore this idea of there always being a new isolated form of 
knowledge about knowledge or whatever to be reconciled with its own fact of being—its fact 
that it itself has its own forms of isolated knowledge to reconcile with the fact that new forms of 
existence are coming, possible, and can possibly arise in any such number of ways. But time 
moves us on to new moments, and so understanding how we understand is not as simple as it 
seems, because time is making it be the case that each case comes with its own set of endless 
repetitions and forms of isolated knowledge that would have to be reconciled with their own 
reconciliations which arise. Again, time means we have to consider these co-occurrences of ever 
shifting but yet often unambiguously felt sentiments. Because this is the background of many 
forms of our thinking, at least to me it seems to be, this means we are caused to think about 
things differently all the time, and now we know why. [Feeling as, seeing as, connecting as, 
feeling the connection between, observing oneself observing oneself, desiring to desire 
something: Each of these shares a kinship through the process of its own becoming across time, 
in relation both to itself and to the other connected aspect of the particular phenomena. This 
background process could be split open by the small example that here follows: What does it 
mean to say that I was happy? I can think of it like any number of things: I was happy, but now I 
am not happy. I was kind of happy in comparison to how I feel now, but that I think about it, I am 
going to have to rate my happiness as even less than what I just thought. I was happy and I must 
confess it to be so. I was happy and I cannot not say that I was happy. Because each state of 
mind is, as we now know, an entirely linguistic occurrence, when we try to abstract away from 
the particulars of its arising, we enter the territory of nonsensical surmising. As section 287 




game from ‘I thought of.. as I said it’”, which means usually that the former case requires more 
deliberation. So, in this example, it will sometimes be the case in each utterance of one of those 
phrases that I intended to think backwards on a certain experience, but not always. If the mental 
occurrence of words happens, then it happens also that I say any of those phrases about 
happiness, and it will be the case that I am feeling that I am intentionally thinking back on a 
certain occurrence. Seeing all things as other things shows the hyper-flexibility of reality in some 
cases over the rigidity of mental conceptions.] 
What is happening with this example right now may seem to be endlessly deceptive and 
uselessly detailed. It may also be the product of a mind that is becoming looser and looser the 
more it tries to spread out across time as it also actually does spread out across time because, at 
least according to time’s mental conception in its own mind, that tells it is mentally travelling 
across time, time is moving it ever forward—which is a very particular occurrence to have. But it 
raises, in this (my) mind, some important points about what it means to reconsider feelings in the 
seat of experience. For instance, Wittgensteinian thought frameworks will tell us (of these types 
of processes) that no thoughts are meant to be entirely self-contained. So, if I consider my 
feelings about anything, I am unable to really understand what it means to do such consideration 
without an affirmation of some type of understanding of an understanding—and, above all, as we 
have already seen countless times so far, the only way to ensure that we can understand how we 
are understanding anything is to add new, also-arbitrary levels of understanding onto our world. 
Is there a solution to this problem of self-knowledge regarding rule-following in terms of 
understanding?  
It is worth it to pause now in order that we might use someone else’s words to get at these 




skeptically. Saul Kripke’s investigation of Wittgenstein’s rule-following in Wittgenstein On 
Rules and Private Language examines the notion of what to him is the fundamental skeptical 
problem of Wittgensteinian thought: how it is possible to mean anything by the idea of “meaning 
anything”. It seems, based on everything we have already discussed above, that nothing can ever 
mean anything, because the natural set out will be one that takes us far away from an original 
acceptance of a rule and to a new, farther-abstracted—and no more justified—secondary, 
tertiary, etc. rule about meaning things. The only possible check on our internal concepts is an 
external one—one based on how others affirm or disconfirm us in and across certain moments of 
word-use. Our form of life, our practice, our activities: these are what ensure not only the hyper-
flexibility of language but the fact that we can even have it all. “Wittgenstein finds a useful role 
in our lives for a ‘language game’ that licenses, under certain conditions, assertions that someone 
‘means such-and-such’ and that his present application of a word ‘accords with’ what he meant 
in the past,” Kripke tells us. “It turns out that this role, and these conditions, involve reference to 
a community” (Kripke, 79). Further, “the set of responses in which we agree, and the way they 
interweave with our activities, is our form of life,” which means the skeptical problem is solved 
at a purely linguistic level. But we still have a problem, because even if our language receives 
affirmation from the sheer number of its users, the idea of grasping concepts in these situations is 
something that is subject to change and also something that has no requirement for being how it 
is, no justification for its being so, nothing demanding it to be as it appears to be. Indeed, Kripke 
straight out tells us that “nothing about grasping concepts guarantees that it won’t break down 
tomorrow” (Kripke, 97). This is a crucial and chilling point. Despite the arbitrary nature of our 
mental arisings, the process of affirmation that occurs when we continually affirm and reaffirm 




to so many changings; yet, it has some inherent stability as a process, since it is what we do 
happen to use to communicate and it works. So Kripke’s solution to the Wittgensteinian problem 
of rules standing in need of other rules to affirm themselves in any causative way is to place the 
burden on multiple users of language at once, despite there being many different ways to view 
and complicate the view of that very fact itself. (Interestingly, any mention of an infinitely 
splitting architecture, for Kripke, is meant to be dismissed on the grounds that we are discussing 
speaking and not the physical world. Of course, my response is to tap into that physical world 
instead of neglect it, which we will see further exemplified in short order.)  
To sum up for now: Understanding how we understand was a set out that made its own 
pathway for us to try to understand it all. But we can still ask if there is a set rule we follow when 
affirming our affirmations of ourselves. It seems like not—at some point we choose randomly to 
accept or reject usages of words. So what makes the random choosing intelligible? Maybe it isn’t 
a question of whether there is such a need for there to be an intelligible and appropriate choice, 
but rather, the idea that to even have a choice is to make it come into being as what it is, and so 
then we call it and think of it intelligible. Our checks on each other, moment to moment, the 
hyper-flexibility of language—that is simply what is, and there is nothing extra to it that we can 
understand at the level of our linguistic arising. Our rule following is not based on a particular 
instance of a random stab in the dark, but is confirmed by other users of language around us, and 
so what we have then is that it is actually based on many instances, coalesced back to one 
instance, in the form of the person or people or group who confirm us. (It is a case of “many 
through the one”, this time: Many instances of its use, making it less skeptical, are arising in the 
form of a single person or group or language as it represents a person or a group and so the 




determination is instead spread out, though we still know it moment by moment, with a hyper 
flexible language system that continually updates itself.) Ultimately, this view makes intuitive 
sense whether we view it from the level of pure linguistic occurrence or that infinitely splitting 
architecture I have dragged along even into this place here. If each time we do this checking on 
each other we update our flexible language system in arbitrarily shifted over amounts, then the 
feelings (and their potential intensities) are what we are comparing, and they become updated in 
almost random amounts at each time. In this way, skepticism about future usage from past usage 
is more easily overcome with feelings that measure themselves across time, especially when 
these feelings are measured again at the outset with other users of language and other feelers of 
feeling, at the level of pure occurrence or even one below it; yet still there remains an 
unavoidably random element to it, because the crossovers of sentiment will arise in randomly 
grouped sums at different times throughout our experiences. That is, our checks on each other 
moment to moment, while occurring at that different level, seem to exhibit that random process 
of sentiment measurement whereby the language users converge on two randomly measured 
sums of feeling and measure them, in their own minds, and against each other’s expressed 
feelings, to arrive at a conclusion which will itself filter out randomly beyond its current vantage 
point, down across time. There is the same underlying process happening here such that I have 
been at pains to elucidate above. I need finally to enter into another example, a final movement 
of a type, to try to exemplify this same sort of process of thinking in another way. I will do this 
and then return, briefly, to the skeptical problem that rests one set out from all that arises as the 
process of thinking and understanding in this final example. We will see that the very same 





Final Movement  
The following is a further exemplification of the processes that happened to be 
demonstrated above within a primary form of “understanding how we understand occurrences of 
our understanding”. This extension and reiteration of those processes has as its impetus the more 
directly formulated question of whether thinking or feeling the same thoughts or sentiments 
across time is possible. We have already seen that pure Wittgensteinian thought rejects the 
notion of any truly repeated sentiment, for reasons that involve the nature of case-by-case 
conceptions of the thinking and feeling discussed above. Yet, a deeper consideration of the land 
beneath the thoughts and feelings should not be ruled out so quickly simply because we do not 
typically have access to this land. Here, I let myself consider this under-grid of always moving 
possibility. The infinite architecture of the ever-shifting processes of our sentiments in the 
physical instances of their occurrence that arises from this consideration as a possible framework 
for understanding the way our feelings move through time is useful for tracing movements 
beyond a singular instance in space and time. For example, when theoretical frameworks that 
work only inside their own language games break down at the face of new information, perhaps 
a way to trace back through and out of them is to follow the more subtle shifts in gradients of 
feeling that stay there all along. A new language game, of course, might arise every moment to 
help us work on the understanding of all these ideas of feelings and sentiments. Nevertheless, we 
will see, hopefully, a kind of splitting open our feelings at the level of comparison, which in turn 
will show us that deeply infinite architecture of ever shifting processes of sentiment that seems to 





Is thinking across time possible? No. Well, to qualify: Thinking across time seems impossible in 
a purely theoretical sense, because we do think across time in a practical one all the time, 
collecting thoughts in reference to others that have gone previously as we do to make sense of an 
entropy-bound existence. Thinking across time in a deeper sense, though—that is, thinking the 
same exact thoughts from moment to moment—seems to be fairly impossible to do. But maybe 
feeling is. If we imagine ourselves swinging on a swing up into the endless black nighttime sky, 
back and forth through (endless gradients of) the freezing winter air, ascending higher and higher 
as we go until we actually are falling through, down below, the cosmos, and riding back up into 
it many more times again, it will strike us that each time we remember, and visualize, the feeling 
of this entire experience will be somewhat different, subject to, among other, ever-shifting 
intensities and amounts of sentiment and comparative moment collection, the arbitrary 
movements of time and possible eternity. We have actually to close our eyes and imagine 
ourselves in this act—the act of feeling the visualization of the same swinging motion up and 
back down through the sky—to pick up on these subtle differences, these infinite gradients of 
occurrence14 that are there only if we pay extremely close attention to how each of the feelings 
literally feels either in isolation or in relation to the rest of the gradients of (feelings of) memory 
surrounding it in and through to its existing somewhat within or even without each subsequent 
iteration. But if we do, we will softly see: each time I visually15 feel myself slip into the sky, 
 
14 Sometimes these “occurrences” are ones of such collected amount and intensity that they are 
what we most properly tend to categorize as “feeling”, but sometimes they are what we would 
instead categorize in that same way as “visual”, sometimes as “comparison”, sometimes as 
“something else”.  
15 There is a debate looming here about whether we ought to separate the visual memories of 
feeling from the ones more strictly isolated to the category of “feeling”. That is, there are infinitely 
many experiences that can be considered as feeling, some of which are gradients of visual 




there’s a tiny shift of perception, so subtle that if we weren’t paying attention we would never 
notice it. This shift, in our felt imaginings of each movement of any given swinging memory, is 
often not only reflected visually. At the same time it’s felt within our bodies, and/or felt or 
understood outside them—it differs every time depending on the shade of the feeling, with some 
instances being a random collection of a little more feeling in the body, some with a little (maybe 
even sometimes “little, little”, qualified so on down and back forever) less feeling in the body, 
some with a mix even of those two broader degrees of amount and/or intensity, depending on 
what amount and mixing intensity came before the specific place of intensity one is feeling, and 
how much of the amount of that (amount of) the before feeling is translated along with it through 
into the current intensity to create ever fading or ever augmented shades/gradients of feeling. 
With the more manifestly visual instances of feeling and imagining and remembering that arise 
from this undertaking, it is clearer that we can, in fact, notice nearly imperceptible shifts between 
small gradients of existence themselves. In one place, there is less force to the first part of the 
feeling, the part that pushes us forward through space and leaves us hanging way high up there. 
Then in the next place, within that same iteration, there is a feeling of a slightly higher force that 
we can feel and visualize at the “same” exact time, “same” here being constructed relative to the 
previous time, the time when we revisit the same height we classify only then in our minds to be 
“the same”, and which we then try to remember as we shift it over to the next instance: But this 
 
over to the visual representation of the memory, so that we might more clearly see the infinitely 
subtle gradients to the “feelings” (“feelings” as a word being a summed set of what is here) that 
arise each subsequent time. These gradients exist also within all the infinitely-splitting “types” of 
memory—feelings somewhat attached to visual representation, feelings less attached than that, in 
this new time, to visual representation, feelings mixed of attachment and less attachment, and so on 
for conceivably ever. But the visual feeling of swinging up into the cold nighttime sky is the clearest 
I can conceive of to demonstrate the infinitesimal shifts of feeling (what I often refer to as “felt 
sentiment” to distinguish between sentiments we feel and sentiments we feel) that occur both 





next instance of the same exact memory is entirely different, if—only if?—we choose to notice, 
because that higher force that was there before feels subtly different this time, even if it is still 
what we would categorize as a “high force”. It feels however it feels relative to the current 
memory; it feels however it feels based on how many of the moments of comparison between 
(the feeling differently of the) feeling differently that we do across memories that it collects; it 
feels, now, a shade lower than before, and the ending of the second part of this second iteration is 
now the lower of forces, in relative comparison. (Relativity is another principle that throws us for 
a (sometimes literally infinite) loop within these understandings. But relativity, even if we define 
it, is itself at least in terms of “how we shift over” always shifting, in a process of much of the 
same tendencies: Our understandings of these shifting gradients of memory and feeling are 
entirely dependent upon how I place myself within the thoughts and the feelings and the visuals. 
For instance, if in the first place I go into the second half of the memory trying to compare the 
first part of the memory (and/or, in conjunction with that, any or all subtle gradients in between; 
for instance: now is a good time to return to ideas of all those random possibilities for sums that 
are highly variable, such as those that contain this collection of intensity of sentiment and not that 
other one from the set that came through, the one where the intensity was felt less in response to 
its comparison, but not this collection of intensity of sentiment that follows from that last bit of 
feeling summed as it moves on with its random collections of summed feelings and breaks with 
them randomly in random amounts in comparison to each new slip into feelings and that 
sentiment of intensity that came later with the ones that then transferred over, but which we see 
now was present in the first option above that occurs with the negative, in random order16) with 
 
16 Reminder from above: This is a “hyperflexible mental occurrence like all others-- sometimes 
comprised of endless think-backs of some sort similar to [the idea of understanding understanding 





hardly ever! I just started with the first most idealistic of thoughts that has arisen here) but usually 
comprised more of a confined moment of randomly grouped and mixed ideas that tells us of certain 
layers to this understanding in arbitrary or at least specific types of ways (i.e., 1, the grouping of 
those infinite variations of understanding the infinite variations of understanding will (themselves, 
in their infinitely varied sets) be one or less  (of the times of understanding included in the specific 
set) in many cases, but 2, our understanding of that understanding contains, in some cases, this and 
that but not, always, that and that and this; and some of those ‘this’es and ‘thats’s will be the idea 
that how we understand knowledge is a form of knowledge about understanding and the methods 
we use to coalesce certain features into understanding, and some will be the idea that how we 
understand knowledge is a form of knowledge about understanding without coalescing it all back, 
to take one example, but lots of others will not be just like so.” This is the same type of process we 
see happening within the feelings about feelings we are doing, well, feeling about above: The way 
the shades of feeling mix over, randomly, is the same kind of process illuminated with other forms 
of knowledge and occurrence, such as the hyperflexible mentality of the ways we go about 
understanding how we understand things, seeing that different shades of feeling lead to different 
sums of information available to the moment’s own certain feeling of what understanding is meant 
to be based on how it as a conceptual feeling is carried over. Remember also what came prior to the 
infinite regression of how we understand understanding above, how we were in fact led into the 
very specificity of the idea: “And now, with this, we have just arrived at our first example of how the 
acquisition of knowledge itself is predicated on this layered process of confined, but also infinitely 
context-sensitive, understandings of what we are attempting to understand. To be sure, understanding 
this mental occurrence happens in its own infinitely varied methods of occurrence; intriguingly, we have 
also now come upon the idea that understanding how we understand in infinitely variable ways that we 
understand understanding mental occurrence through infinitely different methods of (understanding the 
idea of understanding that we understand the infinitely varied ways to understand the infinitely different 
understandings of infinitely varied ways of understanding the infinitely varied understandings of the 
infinitely varied ways of understanding the infinitely varied ways of understanding the infinitely varied 
ways of understanding the infinitely varied ways of understanding, [and so forth down forever and ever, 
each time and occurrence of ‘the infinitely varied ways of understanding’ being actually literally a 
different mental occurrence and—I promise—not just a useless repetition included here for no reason], 
the understanding of) infinitely varied understandings of understanding the infinitely varied ways of 
understanding itself -------Splitting this literal part open to further conception feels like? Whatever it 
feels like will provide the sum that follows this next time----is a hyperflexible mental occurrence like all 
others-- sometimes composed of endless think-backs of some sort similar to the above and which 
happened to reach those certain understandings starting from one moment (though hardly ever! I just 
started with the first most idealistic of thoughts that has arisen here) but usually comprised more of a 
confined moment of randomly grouped and mixed ideas that tells us of certain layers to this 
understanding in arbitrary or at least specific types of ways (i.e., 1, the grouping of those infinite 
variations of understanding the infinite variations of understanding will (themselves, in their infinitely 
varied sets) be one or less (of the times of understanding included in the specific set) in many cases, but 
2, our understanding of that understanding contains, in some cases, this and that but not, always, that 
and that and this; and some of those ‘this’es and ‘thats’s will be the idea that how we understand 
knowledge is a form of knowledge about understanding and the methods we use to coalesce certain 
features into understanding, and some will be the idea that how we understand knowledge is a form of 
knowledge about understanding without coalescing it all back, to take one example, but lots of others 
will not be just like so.) This swing example highlights this same process, on infinite levels itself, as we 




that intention in mind, the feeling is slightly different. This is because the intention to compare 
and grab parts of the memory will itself grab certain contexts—and certain portions to compare 
of the portions that were already chosen randomly when we see only parts of the image in our 
mind and feel each piece a bit differently at each go—and not grab certain others. Does this 
happen in a random amount of felt intensity—not only of felt intensity but of subtle shades of 
difference we can feel only themselves in random, subtle, ever-shifting ways? Only a (hyper-) 
feeling that has collected multiple feelings at once under the guise of a single felt sentiment 
could locate us and place us within this particular scheme. We should also note that there are 
endless gradients of “trying” that can occur, as well, which further complicates matters of 
determination of similarities.) In comparing the different forces, the sum of comparisons 
comprising the feeling of the new moment will contain the collection of the comparisons of the 
first part of the new moment, and the last part of the old moment; or the last part of the old 
moment, in comparison to the first part of the old moment in conjunction with the new 
comparison happening here; or any kind of possibility, each one a random and indeterminate set 
of amounts of comparison that differs in felt intensity from moment to moment. This gradient of 
intensity that we feel in each instance is how we feel to locate: Each time I go into the 
visualization of the feeling there are all these imperceptible shifts, based on location and feeling 
and also the idea that feeling itself is what locates—that would be a locating feeling, which is 
new gradient of types of feeling we don’t often consider—which, again, we can see if we 
visualize/visually feel the swinging and notice the tiny shifts in random places of (often felt) 








as we move along in time. The question that arises, then, is one we have grappled with many 
times before (in some shade of manner): How do we ever know—or at least notice—when the 
gradient of occurrence has enough of this and enough of that, or whatever, to shift over or to be 
placed within a grouping of what it shares through just an affinity to others? Or, at the outset, 
when the gradients of affinity are enough to be classified from within the confines of “memories 
holding three contexts versus memories holding four”, or any kind of arbitrary summation, etc.—
especially if we add our own noticing of these facts into the game? The feelings that locate us 
each time or across different times are still mysterious, I think. Certainly, there is a comparative 
aspect required of the feeling different shades of existence. Let’s try imagining the swinging 
again; rather, let’s try to feel the motion again: one shade of it has now passed, as we slip again 
into the dark unknown sky with a certain feeling. So let’s collect it again, feeling the same way 
of swinging we imagine two times over in a row. (This specificity of numbering will be however 
it happens to randomly arise, so it cannot get more specific than this at this outer level of 
description divorced from a singular particular experience.) Notice how the feeling is slightly 
different, being comprised slightly less of a feeling now and more of a visual exercise. (Or 
perhaps one’s gradients instead shifted almost imperceptibly into a feeling of such specific and 
probably relative intensity that one would instead call it slightly more of a feeling and slightly 
less of a visual exercise, depending on how many gradients of other intensities have been 
compared with their own, dependent-on-on-other-comparisons comparisons to make this new 
one felt in the way it is. Depending also on how one does such a comparison, the shades and 
feelings will change—the possibilities are endless and randomly arising, it appears. It seems like 
a good place to note also that perhaps we should consider that we cannot ever have the exact 




down along the line in time. That is, each of the shades of the motion of swinging, even when we 
bring it back to the beginning of the motion, rewinding it to play again, each one of these shades 
of motion has to start from a slightly shifted place of feeling itself, already. This consideration is 
important but not the end-all-be-all right here.) Nevertheless, precisely when does the transfer 
happen? When do our shifts in feeling happen? The only clue we might have is that certain other 
kinds of feelings are what form our capacity to hold onto multiple of these instances of feelings 
at one time. More sort of “supersets” of feelings that can hold many instances of the different 
gradients of feeling seem to exist: So a single “superset” of feeling will contain a few random 
sets of instances where we felt specific gradients of feeling—perhaps even a few gradients at 
once, even; the order, amount, set and intensity to it is random. This is how we are able, maybe, 
to grasp multiple feelings at once to do context comparison and categorize. But it still seems like 
something is missing—a question we can only answer by saying, “I’m not sure; it’s just 
something I feel.” It seems odd that we can feel (though not think) through time at all if all we 
ever have is specific gradients to the experience of feelings that are in this one moment only. 
Perhaps it is the case that certain feelings, as we have already noted, arise from the mixing of 
these different gradients of feelings and make it so that we are able to hold onto many feelings at 
one time through that single instance of feeling. That is how many different experiences of the 
feeling(s) of the swinging will collect and randomly combine in certain places. Every time we go 
in, it’s a random grouping of different feelings holding different feelings. That is key: The shifts 
in how it feels and how we grab them from the sets that set themselves up. Our feelings take us 
out to supersets of sentiment so that we can know that what we are thinking of is a moment that 
has contained within it some of the previous contexts of times we felt similar things, and so even 




gradients in one moment in a sort of way we have not yet been able to imagine—yet clearly this 
option seems less and less possible. Mostly it seems that it is the case that each sentiment we feel 
is part of the infinite gradients we can feel. If, for instance, the feelings shift in the felt 
imaginings of the swinging, the feeling of what exists in location...no, scratch that; the feeling of 
what is more generally: that is what it is. The feeling slips and the random sets of ever, hyper-
slipping feeling are what are right here, in the form of some more than usual type of slipping, or 
even “hyper” collected feelings of times slipping—that, too, is a different but not unimaginable 
possibility.  
Of course, I have gotten off track here yet again in service of pure wonder. I can bring it 
back around once more to the swinging: If in the second iteration of my remembering there is 
slightly less felt intensity to the second half of the swinging motion, the backwards falling part, 
when does the subtle shift occur? When does it strike us that we are feeling the intensity 
differently? And how does it do that? The how might actually be the most important aspect of 
this process: The feeling. It seems that a feeling arising to connect the multiple parts of a memory 
as it passes by comes up and, because it serves as a handle that can take certain parts of the 
shades of experience and make them felt as a specific, comparative intensity at once, the 
imperceptible shifts in the collected aspects of the felt, visual imagination of swinging are 
summarily derived from the scene in random, always-differing but also “always moving onto the 
next moment in a relative fashion and what those comparisons create for the intensity to feel and 
be like then” amounts. Since the feeling holds onto for us multiple of the gradients of 
amount/intensity, we do not notice the shifts in intensity of feeling until they reach a certain, 
arbitrarily decided threshold—sometimes, in fact, we may never even notice the shift, instead 




(collected sums of) feelings that have gone prior to our arrival in the new moment. In the move 
back up into the sky, the feeling of just that will pick out for our felt forms of perception random 
sums of information that we feel in relation to other random sums of felt information that are 
gliding effortlessly into the next moment in manners felt only through relative forms (of relative 
forms of) understanding that we can feel and that can be carried over from just other sets that 
have done the same exact thing all the way on down and through our moments with subtle and 
imperceptible shifts in all those (what feel relative to at least right now to be the) same kind of 
ways we went through above. (Whether these random sums of information are more related to 
the feeling of the feelings, or the location of the feelings, or the location of the feelings felt by 
other feelings later on, or even instead less of feelings and more of visual instances—this is just a 
randomness of occurrence.) In other words, we compare felt sums of information using different 
felt sums of different gradients of information to feel the gradients at one time, either before they 
shift over to the next moment of summed feeling or after, or occasionally both before and after, 
if that is how the specificities of the sums reaching into and thus creating the current feeling 
should arise. When I feel myself reach the top part of the memory of swinging up towards that 
sky, the feeling of each piece of what I am seeing collects instances that have passed by, having 
themselves collected instances that had passed by, so on down the line, through each of the 
instances that came before, stopping and starting in randomly collected amounts the process of 
the collection of different amounts of this process of collection (of a process of collection, of a 
process of collection, of a process of collection17, etc., that itself is—down even sometimes to the 
point where we would instead have to say, “that themselves are”, due to the fact that a singular 
understanding of the extensive back-process of ever-extending collection would have multiple of 
 
17 Such as replicated by process in the infinite understanding architecture above, the endless 




itself contained within it to make is so that it is—always moving on, sometimes even extending 
farther back than that, on and on) of felt and summed intensities in arbitrary manners throughout 
the entirety of the always shifting process of noticing feelings, before or after, or sometimes 
before and after. That is: There is a feeling at the top of the memory (which happens also to be 
the “top” located in the visual of the upward swinging motion—that doubled nature is what a 
memory is, here; but we know, of course, that certainly isn’t always so). This top feeling is 
composed of a very specific range of gradients of intensities of feeling that were collected in 
random amounts by each subtle and imperceptible shift between, and moving into, each felt 
location of the visualized memory feeling. Yet, just how far back this set of shifts of feeling that 
are collected and made into more of more just one sentiment by feelings that differ in amount 
and intensity depending on how far back they themselves go in their own collecting of the 
shifting moments actually goes is ultimately appearing to always, in a manner abstracted from 
these sets of thought, be random and due to factors outside of our control. It could extend 
through that whole “process of the collection of ‘(a process of collection [of a process of 
collection, of a process of collection, and so on forever] itself that is sometimes even extending 
farther back on and on)’ all those processes that have collected some amounts of information, 
information that is to be felt in whatever manner depending on the intensity of the randomly 
summed feelings—feelings, that is, which are holding onto many sentiments of summed feelings 
themselves all at once in their particular form of felt ‘feeling that only feels like one instead of 
many because of its own arbitrary intensity’”; or it could stop with only some of those collected 
sums of (feeling, felt, visual) shifts in the also felt form of also one sentiment in such a way that 
that is how we understand it to have occurred and felt. This happens, it seems, both at the level of 




of mixing of those two things happens to arise. Some will contain only the feelings of before and 
after; some will contain the feelings of before, and before that before, and after; some yet will 
also contain the feelings of the location of the memory, or the location of the memory but not 
more than a few isolated sets of, instead, the feeling of the location of the memory in our 
minds—or even what we feel to be the location of the memory in reference to later parts but not 
what is the total location at another instance. (Because, certainly, this idea of total location 
itself stands in need of collected sums of feeling shifting imperceptibly into one another 
moment by moment to provide us with a feeling that there is some kind of comparative 
total in whatever point of feeling we are in then. This understanding of understanding amid 
the infinite under-grid of conception relates to section #2 as well as to footnote 16 above 
and the extensions that follow below and can be read in conjunction with those two forms 
of processing for a more complete understanding of the varieties of the wholes that 
comprise this sort of process.)18 Further, a singular sentiment cannot be divorced from the 
others, except in our perception of it, which perception in the form of summed feelings under 
often the guise of a sentiment of one feeling only or a closer shade of feeling spread more 
extensively throughout time serves to make it be felt with different intensities in the relativity of 
comparison. In light of all of this, then, this top feeling has been made from all the shades that 
went before it and yet we only ever feel certain intensities of the feeling at one time, although 
 
18 For instance, in this case, where the whole of what it means to understand is always shifting, the 
comparative total will be one that includes some sums of the specific amounts and intensities of the parts of 
understanding that have trailed across time in certain ways to make it to the current place of feeling in their 
current form but not others, in the same way the examples of infinite regression in understanding functioned 
above. This comparative total will filter through the amounts and intensities of our feelings in select shades 
and gradients of itself, which we can see if we focus in on the hyper-slipping motion of space and time that 
seems to form these thoughts. In addition, we see that this process takes on the same motions as what will 
follow below, in the form of reckoning with gradients that trail across time and space in ways that are hyper-
specific and always splitting according to how they are themselves possessed of their own amounts and 
intensities of sums, that is, in a manner also reminiscent of the idea that understanding how we understand 
an idea like understanding itself takes the utilization of always shifting amounts and intensities of feeling at a 




each of these necessarily singular moments of feeling do seem to contain qualified sentiments 
pulled from a precise instance of comparison. And so to recapitulate (only a few of) these ideas 
so far, a little more clearly: The first swinging motion has a specific feeling to it. The next swing 
up into the sky (as I repeat the memory) feels a tiny, tiny shade different to the one that preceded 
it. During the iteration that follows that, the shade changes again—but I also can feel the same 
feeling of the first iteration, not in isolation, but at the same time as I am feeling the new feeling 
in this instant. This is why I say that a single feeling in a single instance can help us to, actually, 
feel more than one thing (derived from behind us from across multiple moments) at that one 
time. It seems to me it isn’t just a singular new feeling, like Wittgenstein would demand we 
imagine, that occurs in every single moment anew. (Well, it is, in the sense that only whatever 
arises in the particular moment of sentiment is what we feel. But I mean to say that our capacity 
to reach into the under-web of the world that Wittgensteinian thought developed our 
understanding of is larger than perhaps the typical comprehension of that type of worldview 
would suggest possible.) Instead new moments are continually updated with the shades of feeling 
that have gone before them: meaning they are actually composed of many feelings masquerading 
as a singular felt sentiment, extending back in time in random amounts. We can feel multiple 
feelings at an apparently singular moment in time because they are able to blend into one 
another, creating other feelings anew as each moves ever forward. This is also why it is 
important that we understand that the ideas of “singular” versus “multiple” are themselves hyper-
flexible concepts that depend on this same process of continual, shading into themselves 
updating. A felt sentiment of singularity is sometimes going to actually be many instances in 
one. It may sound wild to say that the concept of time being broken up into points is only 




many ways it appears that the singularity versus the plurality of moments is dependent only on 
what the sums of feeling make us feel—or not feel. Keeping these clearer, “slightly more 
abstracted to an overview status type of” structures in mind, I will return once more to the 
swinging, to see how it feels now. Time has, of course, moved on.  
I tell myself to imagine the swinging for yet another time. This time I want to remember 
when it was cold and dark as I swung high up out through the wind towards the deep 
endlessness, where tiny gradients of light thousands of lightyears away hid quietly in the icily 
silent sky as I sailed through all the empty space. The first memory I have in this current time is 
one that collects all those specific feelings at once, so I feel the motion of the movement in its 
particular, random range just when it braces itself high out at the top of the swell. In this current 
moment, the idea of “singular” feels to me, and passes by in time as though it is, actually, the 
sum of several pieces of that felt information: the bracing motion of movement high at the top of 
the arc’s range of felt momentum; the rushing fall back towards the ground before sliding back in 
place again; the feeling of the cold wind hitting the backs of my ears as the dark sky ascends 
back in up on itself in my vision and the stars fade away above my head for a while before I 
plunge back into them on my way out again. The feeling of the feeling of the momentum in my 
body, the momentum that shot me back and forth through the air on that cold windy night, this 
momentum now feels a particular way via a collected sum in my mind, a sum that is in this 
moment held tight behind the confines of a singular sentiment of feeling. (That is what 
“singular” is like right here. How did I know, even now, to use the word “singular”, though? I 
did not possess the full range of uses in my mind as I thought about it. Rather, my feelings 
seemed to carry, in arbitrary amounts, themselves through time, having collected certain shades 




moment of the feeling of what singular is like here, in randomly meted comparison to other 
moments that possessed themselves a similarly copied—but always different and accordingly 
defined—range of uses. We cannot seem to extend the idea of a word farther than that process, 
as we conceive of it—that process, again, that collects these shades randomly, over into one 
another, helping us know in a singular moment (that is connected only to some moments by this 
very fact of randomly-grouped and distributed feeling) more than one use of a word. For an 
extension beyond that, we must appeal to updating that occurs on a macro-level of continual 
person-to-person usage. Here we have been more focused on the idea of our own private 
feelings, although, of course, even these are nothing without reference, on certain levels, to our 
shared ones. Yet still I submit that the deeper process of feeling is the one we are in the middle 
of further illuminating just right now, and that this process is one that splits open more easily in 
private methods of considering the infinite architecture of continuous sentiment slippage: when 
this process transfers over to the realm of felt sentiments, the process is more intimately felt, 
making the gradients seem infinitely more complex. That is, with definitional aspects of meaning 
across time we find the same process of ever shifting sentiment collection pulsing in the 
background, but with continuous attention to deeper felt sentiments the process in its form of 
infinite physical standing opens itself up to view more readily, something else that comes up here 
that we ought to keep in mind.) Back again on the swinging, I make myself go yet another time, 
starting slightly further along in space and recollection, but sailing nonetheless in the “same” 
pattern back and up into the sky. With deeper analysis and sustained attention to how it feels, we 
see that the “same” feeling of this entire “singular” event has now on this sailing shifted, because 
on this go, the momentum from the last time has trailed across by feeling to my current felt 




I am feeling-through-imagining now, which means that the randomly collected sum of this 
instance is one that contains the comparison between shades of feeling through a set of multiple 
collected sentiments as well as the current standout of the new gradient of feeling that emerges 
from that, all felt as one sentiment since feelings hold onto those many different things so that we 
may grasp them uniquely, and alone, but yet in reference to the other sets of feelings from 
multiple other times at once—even if, eventually, some of those gradients to that very collected 
sentiment with its multiplicity in status will be dropped as I continue forward through the process 
of re-imagining or even just normal forward-feeling through time, and even if, of course, what 
those places of ease-up in terms of collection of sentiment carried through comparison are will 
be mostly what we might categorize across a few moments as random and collected in their own 
arbitrary sums. So the second iteration of the swinging motion is one that sees feelings from the 
first trail into the next (felt, often, to be singular) instance of a set of feelings so that we have 
with its then-sentiment compared the last intensity of feeling in this current situation with 
reference to the last intensity of feeling in the last situation in the form of a singularly spread 
sentiment that itself ‘arises with’ some parts of the now beyond doubly subsequent and 
accordingly rendered particular gradient of this mixing intensity but yet even under the influence 
of those some-parts of the now beyond doubly subsequent and accordingly rendered particular 
gradient of this mixing intensity alongside which it does that hyper-set set of arising ‘takes on’ 
its own unique gradient in the new moment, depending on how our new moment is possessed of 
the splits of prior feeling(s)—depending, that would be, on whether our new moment has as 
comprising its shade (of the always-trailing gradients) of shifted amount and intensity ‘the last or 
(sometimes just trailed by amount and intensity-) first part of the last or (sometimes just trailed 




mixing in relation to the then-sentiment’, ‘the last or (sometimes just trailed by amount and 
intensity-) first part of the last or (sometimes just trailed by amount and intensity-) first moment 
as it goes into the next one and does the comparative mixing in relation to the then-sentiment’, 
or ‘the last or (sometimes just trailed by amount and intensity-) first part of the last or 
(sometimes just trailed by amount and intensity-) first moment after it goes into the next one and 
does the comparative mixing in relation to the then-sentiment’, ‘each’ in conjunction with some, 
compared-accordingly gradient (of a gradient) of amount and intensity of feeling in the new 
moment of a now comparatively-mixed-and-consequently-beyond ‘then-sentiment’, i.e., “the last 
or (sometimes just trailed by amount and intensity-) first part of the last or (sometimes just 
trailed by amount and intensity-) first moment, for instance, before it goes into the next one to do 
the comparative mixing in relation to what becomes at this juncture a hyper- formed then-
sentiment ‘and is compared, through another trailed amount and intensity of that particularly 
arisen gradient of feeling of that new trailed amount and intensity (of a trailed amount and 
intensity) of feeling, at that point that we call “before” in reference to the other trailed 
amount and intensity (of a trailed amount and intensity) of that particular gradient of feeling, 
as opposed to being compared through a trailed amount and intensity of that particularly 
arisen gradient (of a trailed amount and intensity) of feeling of that new particular gradient to 
the other doubly and almost, then, triply trailed amount and intensity (of a trailed amount and 
intensity) of a now even newer particular gradient of feeling at that point that we call “after”, 
in such a type of reference, a type of reference where in fact in both hyper-trailed ranges of 
cases the comparison of the trailed amount and intensity (of the trailed amount and intensity) 
of the feeling takes place almost entirely after the trailed gradients of amount and intensity of 




point termed to exist before and the point-termed-to-exist-before’s gradient of amount and 
intensity’s later point of comparison’”, and so on for all of these possible splitting gradients 
and the other ones, to the extent that each gradient of felt sentiment towards the notions of points 
“before” and “after” even in their sometimes apparent relation to the idea of splits of those 
same amounts and intensities (of amounts and intensities) of these times trails according to the 
conditional and collected sum of its contingent parts before taking on what we feel to determine 
as a state of being compressed into the idea of a certain feeling of the idea of what “last” or 
“before” or anything “particular” is in reference to the other shaded gradients in their 
dependent and interconnected judgements of the relatively “first” spreading moment, and so 
forth, or even before taking on what we feel to determine in this new moment as a trailed 
gradient of amount and intensity of all the collected trailed gradients of amount and 
intensity derived from within the collections whereby these first earlier gradients trailed 
over to relate to the later trailed gradients of amount and intensity both before and after 
their subsequently rendered determinations; sometimes “even all that starting from the 
conjunctive split in comparison of the idea of ‘each’ split above” in conjunction with any 
combination of these larger ‘places of either before or after comparison’ options and the 
rest of the trailed gradients of amount and intensity that happened with each felt sentiment 
through their relations to these split points of comparison, where such combinations of felt 
sentiment collected in the method of trailing gradients that split up the ideas of the last and first 
and middle feelings of parts of splitting feelings in ways we have seen trail in trailed gradients 
of comparison already will as just mentioned in all those relativistic manners above derive their 
specificity by how they shade over themselves, indeed come to be in gradients that work in this 




themselves in a manner more similar to the last iteration of sums than anything else in terms of 
sets of sentiment collection that could arise right now. (That is, for that last part there, if we slow 
it down a bit, and halt some of the shifting gradients so that we can better understand what is 
happening at a more abstracting swinging level: the possibilities of the combinations of different 
shades of feeling in different orders such as mentioned more extensively above will be 
themselves subject to certain amounts of shared gradients of sentiment that within their felt 
singularity can split out to different gradients of further sentiment—the way in which the first 
moment of swinging memory trails into the next moment of swinging memory, say, in the as it 
goes over category, is going to itself be subject to the same process of gradient trailing discussed 
above to define for its own instance of existence just what that trailing as it goes over feels like 
and thus to our minds can consist of, not only in comparison to other moments but also in its 
own, extracted right. For instance, the trailing as it goes over could be composed of several 
shaded-into-each-other sentiments that trailed in whatever particular way they did (and that will 
also, note, give us what we use to compare the sentiments at a higher-felt level); or it could be 
composed of sentiments that have shaded into each other again, a farther step down the line, 
having as usual shifted with time, perhaps enough that we happen even to notice their sudden 
difference and then categorize accordingly. Depending on how intensely the felt, combined shifts 
“holding within their fluid confines varying degrees of trailing for the idea of trailing that 
apportions the sentiments out according to that trailing itself” occur, that is how the feelings 
decide for us how the “as it goes” feels in comparison to the “before it goes”, which 
determination will ultimately be subject as its own endeavor as well as in its felt outputs of 
function to the particular ways the shading of each position of the endless possibilities for what 




placement of its own shifts in (itself trailed) felt sentiment and how those (themselves trailed) 
shifts in felt sentiment make it there—and later!—feel to be. And even this process seems to 
happen again, and so on forever across and down into the usual imperception, in the ways 
illuminated quite extensively above: with the second iteration we could see that there could be 
different comprised shades of the last or first moment depending on how the shades slip over into 
one another, at each felt point of sentiment along the gliding line, to the effect that there are 
contained within each of the felt slips of infinitely splitting gradients of imperceptibly, endlessly 
shifting other forms of gradients, other forms of just that as well, felt depending on their specific 
splits based on all kinds of relations to the ways above. Not only this, but so also might other 
ways of doubling back on the splits as we think about them cause further chaos, to the extent 
that, even, rules such as “have too many feelings at once and the shift over is not as clearly 
defined” could arise, but I will not get into that now.) We see, then, if we commit to another 
slight deceleration, that the second iteration of the swinging memory contains trailed gradients of 
feeling, trailing into new gradients of feelings, all under the sentiment of one go, depending on 
how deep we are prepared to split the felt moments and look, which process creates different 
versions of the sentiment of “one” each time. If I go a third time into the swinging, the trailing 
gradients of memory are engaged in the same activity of dropping some contexts and holding 
onto others at many, ever-splitting levels of the process of feeling across time: This third time is 
comprised of a certain amount of the (felt) measure of the intensity of the first two iterations, 
which iterations’ own feelings filtered, as they did, down through time in randomly grouped and 
accordingly intense sets of bits of feeling. This newer momentum of the swinging, as a result, all 
of a sudden contains a much more intense feeling to it; one that is comprised of feelings that 




shifted gradients of those two that have themselves also trailed into it in random, compared-by-
intensity-and-held-up-in-the-mind-as-a-sum-of-that-intensity-in-a-new-and-often-singularly-felt-
intensity amounts. The very specific nature of its intensity and according “grabbed amount of 
context” is one that happens to hold onto a certain amount of the previous moments of feeling 
when it comes to this memory. The feelings could have chosen to group sentiments in other 
random ways; but the minute nature of the shifting that happens on a much more intimate, 
immediate level such as has been expounded in this felt swinging memory makes it clear that the 
collections of feeling and context come down to tiny, imperceptible shifts when they are made 
closer in time as opposed to farther across time. Random sums of (often-comparative,) felt 
information glide effortlessly into their next iterations, possessing as the sums that make any 
given intensity the collected sums (which themselves occasionally contain iterations of 
themselves in different collected sums of gradients of sentiment) of each moment prior to the one 
that is felt in the instance of now. How these sums reform is arbitrary; even whether they do is 
also up for grabs at any given instance: Sometimes they will extend back in time with slight 
differences that trail across moments fluidly to create new amounts that are felt in different 
intensities based on just how many of the gradients they are composed of as they slide over 




there-as-a-sum sort of way. But other times these sums will extend back in time with only a few 
of their felt differences, differences that are starker because they have been cut off and compared 




the memory. Some of the deeper felt aspects of the third set of thoughts about the system of 
swinging now fade away, and as I have compared the feeling of that in this new moment yet 
again, there is yet another nearly imperceptible shift in the gradient of the old sentiment, one that 
as its own ever-shifting feeling trails along with that gradient of the old sentiment to create the 
newer composed feeling in this particular iteration. Some of the feelings of the last go are held 
onto as a feeling of “multiplicity in sum”, while others of the last go are not held in the same 
status of that multiplicity, favoring instead to randomly appear as a truly singular felt sentiment. 
Underneath the set of feelings that has trailed along to create this new moment of sentiment, 
though, there almost certainly has to be at some point along the line where the sum is actually a 
feeling that is multiple in its singularity—the shift in gradients that carries over in random 
amounts of felt intensity has as its handle on the passing of time this very sum of multiplicity. 
Suppose the feeling of the fourth go of the memory all of a sudden shifts over right now while 
we are in the middle of feeling a randomly-intense-according-to-how-its-gradients-trailed-
through-time sum of certain felt multiplicity. We can contrast this with what would happen if the 
feeling of the fourth go of the memory shifted a tiny, nearly imperceptible “sliver of a feeling” 
later on in the sequence of what we feel—i.e., what composes the idea of felt “time” here: In the 
first case, the shift is going to entail a small amount of the gradients of trailing from the last felt 
comparison of feelings, depending on how much and what amount of the last bits of trailing it 
itself collects (and compares accordingly to make their particular idea in the form of felt 
sentiment of amounts) of the previous memories of the iteration. Perhaps this first case turns out 
to contain only a certain piece of the trailing of the sentiments—only a certain amount of the 
endlessly shifting processes of sentiment comparison happening below. We will feel just slightly 




case, having shifted over from the last part of the memory just a tiny hair earlier, will be 
composed instead of a slightly different amount of the trailing and thus will be felt accordingly. 
So it turned out then that this last moment was felt in this particular way.  
At this point it might be tempting to extend the mind all the way out at this point and 
imagine that the sums of intensity of feeling that are collected always contain all the pieces of 
what has gone before. On some levels, it seems like the extension of a sum of information can 
only happen from within the confines of a singular “idea”; or what we group to be an idea. 
(Example: my very call here to extend the mind out farther to see what lies beyond. This might 
make it seem that we can go into a singular idea endlessly and create more with it, extending out 
forever as we go—if only we are wary of that it comes back to a “singular” idea or set of ideas.) 
But what we group to be a singular idea is composed of this whole under-web of every-second-
shifting, randomly grouped and always re-updated feelings-transfers. So this larger under-web 
that I have been trying to illuminate is one that must be reckoned with, if we are to really extend 
outwards without the extension being one that goes out only from a particularly summed set of 
contexts that we call “one idea”. That is, the truer set of more fully-realized extensions is the one 
that takes into its account the whole under-web of the feelings that shift all the time into their 
confined contexts, the one that doesn’t spread out under the guise of one idea but instead reflects 
all its shades and variants, as they are updated and felt in certain intensities of perception, all the 
way across ever-extending sets of time. (Remember, time itself is likely a reflection of this 
similarly split and amount and intensity guided existence; but that’s a thought to try to extend 
into—more broadly, if we take to considering more felt splits of contexts rather than one 




conception—another “time”.) Whether this truer set of understandings is worth anything, only 
ever-shifting states of time will tell.  
[Sometimes we do have very isolated feelings that come up and that suggest a range of possible 
amounts of occurrence to them (i.e., a thought that tells us, “what if we could hold onto multiple 
shapes at one time in our minds to compare their boundaries while also taking the sum of their 
shapes to create some newer visual” being comprised of many different instances we thought 
similar things). But this happens without us being aware of those other things. So something 
beneath the thoughts before we get them is happening, perhaps the process of feeling 
comparison. But is there a way in which there is a pause before each shift, one where we can do 
with the feeling more what we would like, before it fades over into the next moment? The other 
thing to remember is we can’t really number the contexts. The idea of number here is a felt 
collection of different moments and shades so subtle as to evade understanding without being 
summed with other shades we feel. Nevertheless, going down into the smallest instances of 
feeling has a surprising result: we can see that sometimes there is space just before the collection 
of different feelings that lies open to manipulation. Back in the motion of the memory of 
swinging, it is our recognition of a particular movement that stays high up without any reference 
to its trailing gradients of felt visual instance that enables us to feel an even softer moment of 
transition into the next moment. All these thoughts are extra, yes, but demand to be reckoned 
with.] 
If we think, now, back to Kripke’s skepticism regarding rule-following, we will see that 
this same deeply splitting process of updating the meaning of a word according to the randomly 
collected amounts and intensities of its feelings of use across time is exemplified there, yet was 




resets, to the effect that the issue of meaning anything across time was instead supposed to be 
solved by the appeal to a larger level of continually updated, intrapersonal checking across 
multiple users of language. The under-level of the arisings of occurrence was ignored in favor of 
pure linguistic existence, to the effect that the updating in random amounts and intensities at 
random times in arbitrarily collected sums had to occur at the intrapersonal level. But now that 
we have seen that going down into the smaller moments of each felt sentiment means further 
complicating the picture of how we are even able to update felt information for ourselves on a 
more moment to moment basis in any given first instance, it seems clearer that the same process 
of random affirmation might take place at the slightly shallower level of intrapersonal updating 
but is still superseded or at least augmented by a process in the same vein at a deeper level. In 
other words, sustained attention to the nearly imperceptible shifts of feeling during forwards and 
backwards thinking in time demonstrates how the checking that happens on a more intimate level 
is a type of reupdating by what I postulated to be the “amount” and “intensity” of  the subtly 
sliding gradients of feeling—and, thus, the only thing, I have argued by method of elucidation of 
the infinite process of thinking and feeling above, that can show us our way around the ever 
splitting architecture of our (of a type) physical world is to use a similar process of ever shifting 
understandings of thinking and feeling. This is not a solution to the skeptical problem of word 
meaning in a direct sense, but rather an exemplification of how the issue of always-shifting 
language games and contexts and even context comparisons within and outside these language 
games can be attacked with its own process of infinitely shading gradients of updates and 
amounts. This is, I suppose, a solution only inasmuch as it might provide us a newer set of 




then perhaps to sidestep it by taking a leap of faith into the deeply evasive, ever-shifting 
unknown.  
[If the under-formulation of our sort of reality is one that is infinite in any of the types of ways I 
have tried to illuminate and use above, then it only makes sense that we will need to use a 
process of thinking and feeling that will move us beyond the confines of a singular, random 
shade of certain amount and intensity of feeling to be able to draw ourselves most fully out 
through time and across ever-shifting, not just language-, but reality- games. This “way”, of 
course, is not a singular way but instead a hyper sliding process in the continual development of 
its own shades and gradients.]  
There is one more thing I feel I can note. Within these subtle shifts before the context 
comparison, there is a place where we can create. Before the gradients split and filter down, 
before the last edges of the final memory fade into the next, there is a smaller, quieter place, a 
place where, ahead of the tiny shifts of perception and feeling, there is no classification, no reach 
to the randomly felt sets of information extending into a contextualizing and categorizing context 
comparison (which itself, of course, remember, will be messy and extending backwards into time 
as well). This subtle place is one of quiet strength; it has no judgement to it, no randomly forced 
memories, no harder type of creation that could reach out and make it what it thinks it is meant to 
be. This is the place instead where infinitely splitting gradients take note of themselves, and 
smile, because they are swinging into the sky, dropping back and lurching forward in varying 
amounts of felt intensity, gathering some amounts of context but not others, sailing through the 














Nothing in the extreme is ever good,  
Yet love is not subtle.   
 
There is so, so much beauty in this world. What do we do with it?  















Once I spoke enthusiastically, if with a bit of out-there conviction, about how zooming out of 
space and time would show us what linearity never could, how that looking back across random 
groupings of arbitrarily spaced out moments would be like zooming out only in one particular 
place, even if the universe were in fact infinite. This, to me, meant the ideas could transfer over 
to each spot along the line, but in different ways at different times, all with the effect of creating 
a circular motion just like the momentum we achieved in the type of exercise where we swung 
and threw ourselves across the floor. Any moment of pause would rewrite the entire system, but 
not without it having been already anticipated in the circularity of rebounding momentum, both 
before and after whenever time was chosen as the central starting spot. I threw in other ideas 
about infinity there at the end, adding in even more abstract sets outside thinking about people 
thinking about themselves and looking back on themselves, reflecting on their own reflections in 
infinite loops, and so forth, but I finally ended with a subtle note on the merits of discussing 
pointed thoughts about the world, about making things exist in process where before there were 
none, such as when the thoughts didn’t want to be discussed for lack of conviction.  
“I’m sending you on a journey,” he said to me. “Just focus on the journey.” He sent me 
his address. The whole way there I moved out into the panic, drifting slowly, zooming my eyes 
in and out of my immediate vision, and breathing in affected bursts. The immense disjunction 
between myself and the world widened swiftly as I watched the cold early-winter darkness spiral 
down across a never-ending line into the frost-laced pavement below my feet. In the five minutes 
it took for him to open his door, I leaned against a telephone pole and stared into the endless 
black of the sparse and freezing nighttime sky, where a bright moon was stark in the middle of 
all an infinite desolation. I closed my eyes and breathed in that deeply penetrating wintertime 




void, vast swaths of cosmic emptiness burning in my lungs. We hugged when he let me in. The 
cold off my leather coat and golden-brown hair wrapped around us but fell at our skin, leading us 
when it abated as if by a trillion sets of infinitesimally vibrating strings to his living room, where 
we both sat and waited as I stared intensely, setting all my attention and energy dead out in front 
of me, falling towards the edge of the stars. There was so much intensity. And so much of it 
spread across divergent thinking, across all the moments that time would make, if we were lucky. 
He said he knew what I needed and told me to come sit next to him. When he pulled me into his 
chest, the position was uncomfortable for my head, but I didn’t dare to move it. We held each 
other tightly, tightly, tightly. I would remember for the rest of my life these small, quiet hours, 
the aching loneliness that abated within them in that one time, and the other kind of aching 
loneliness that simultaneously grew larger in another, a time light-years away in space, a space 
that in time was lost forever in the unceasing eternities of certain black and hostile stars. It would 
be only in that second, far-off new place, the place where my mind one day would fail, long 
lonely years after his, that I would understand them to be the smallest, quietest hours of my 
whole life, self-aware, caution-filled pauses before infinity up and kept on unending. I left before 
another time could come.  
 
I had been reading earlier that day of the reckoning, hiding out behind where it happened, 
waiting in the cold outside for him to get home so he would call. It was a book called The Road 
to Reality by the physicist Roger Penrose, more than one thousand pages of the laws of the 
physical universe. I had been trying to reconcile the guide with my theories of the endless 
doubling and extension of infinity, theories I would later learn were no different than the type the 




one set away from his speculations from an unendingly different, itself ever-splitting, context 
about the infinite sizes of infinity that existed and the Absolute Infinity where those ended when 
the human mind needed to go back to Unity. In his house that night, he pulled me onto his lap so 
that I sat with my legs folded around him and said he was sorry, he was so sorry. He gently 
pulled my head forward and rested it on his own so that we were touching foreheads, staring 
down into one another. We stayed like that for a long time. I could feel his blood pulse. Don’t 
cry. The longing was too great for me, but he stood up abruptly when my tears came harder, and 
I hit the cold ground with bare legs.  
When I left, a deep pain ached in my chest, not the beautiful kind but the one most awful, 
and I tried to hold The Road to Reality close to me. It only hovered just beyond my skin, couldn’t 
fully touch. I wanted to throw it into the street. Later that night I went to my bed certain there 
was nothing left, and I dreamed in the morning of an icy river falling upwards in space at a time 
when the aching is hauntingly, deceptively spare.  
But we kept it going, and he let me in from the cold several times after that, before it was 
actually over.  
 Fundamental irreducibility. How can we be sure it exists? That is a question, I know, for 
the (fundamentally irreducible) ages. I will come back to this question in about a year, then it 
will fade away, before it returns two times, once at the end of college and again at the end of my 
life.  
Sometimes exponentially doubling, split-apart thoughts and notions fold back in on 
themselves.   
 “Here’s one to think about,” he tells everyone later, lapsing into one of his spiritual 




change. It strikes me that he is depressed. But this is nothing new. I stay behind as everyone 
leaves, rummaging through the pockets in my jacket, nerves rising and falling in accordance with 
the wind I hear outside, and the feelings I imagine live within it. He walks back from his busy 
rounds saying good-bye to everyone else, but when he does, he moves right past me, through the 
dark. I head for the door when he comes back around, and all he says, right as I’m closing the 
door and it shuts, is “Bye, Julie,” and I fumble to reopen the door, and say, “Bye!” with a soft 
laugh, and I think I see him smile just before it closes again.  



















It was always for the one I knew a moment before infinity, sailing under a pink snow sky, 
vast ages of time eclipsing far out in the distant cosmos—when we danced, small, over the ice, 
and our thoughts suspended slowly around us as the whole of the universe quickly expanded to 
the bright white light of pure, undiluted nothingness and everything grew exponentially in depth 
and inner lightness so that we had hope in endless gradients, even one was just fine, and 
affinities of memory swung over the edges of our peripheries, out of stasis, into the beautiful 
temporary filtering. But it was all so easily extending into the great enormity of a single breath, a 
lifetime of lifetimes written on the edges of our wonderings, telling the story of all things 
inherently unknowable in the land of a world made from the fullest parts of the tiniest elements 
of imagination, and finally, sometime late in the depths of the dark, swollen night, ceasing, 
really, to ever be much of anything at all. So when in the morning with the erasure of all of our 
most inconceivable of thoughts the brilliant wintertime sun peeked hesitantly over the edge of 
the bridge of his awareness, the faint sound of all that I had ever known reached a split-off, and I 
knew that at least at one point I could not know what might happen, but I took his hand anyway, 
felt it close gently on mine, and stayed awhile in that brilliant, ever-intensifying light of 
nothingness, the place from which no mind in sum ever returns, the place where we became an 
eternally repeating loop replicating itself from within the warmth of the confines of a single, 
simple thought, the place in whose inner chasms of wind-whipped existence we rode out farther 
into tinier, ever-fading memory when we found the frozen river and became another eternally 
repeating loop replicating repeatedly before again, as it all dwindled away, spreading gently out 
to the lightness where a darker winter formed newer affinities of recollection to force on hold. 
Yet the pink sky simultaneously led us as if by an infinitesimal set of vibrating strings towards 




vagueness of some always-moving retention of thought, and it was then that we felt as though we 
were no longer at the same place of deepness but rather the place where, at last, in alternative to 
watching life burn thoroughly in slow-motion, move steadily within the indefinitely random 
transition between its inner-turned-outer shades forcefulness, or engage outside, inside, and 
within, the meaning of what could be if all that could ever have been was not what we had 
become, we could see now instead spatial time made carefully into a quiet crying, a gentle 
sorrow, or a calmer mind, when the others around us—the ones I saw softly if my mind made 
new sums or new melodies to connect those sums, and, throughout and besides much of it, new 
sentiments, as the old ones hit the luminescence—started funneling through a gradual dissolution 
of impossible forms of being, started moving endlessly out of our way, started evading at every 
inconceivable point along the line the horizon of recollected limits so they could exist for a 
transient moment, that ahead of their watching our eyes shift over to the beginning of the 
wilderness, ahead of their sensing the minute presence of vast swathes of cosmic emptiness 
burning in our lungs when cold inhalations sent absolutely chilling ice through our bones out 
past us, ahead, even, at the end of their lives, of coming into that spacetime time of incisive 
explosion and time-space space of reckless control one step underneath what was always often 
but sometimes never trying to be below the temporal, interstellar night which originally bore 
those empty feelings, they were able to notice the life flicker on again, and engage with the 
infinitude, only here with bolder intentions of what it was to create the reckoning out of hope we 
ourselves might endure a hollow distant shore, on a rigged ship sailing upwards, where our own 
ghosts roam alone haunting seas from day to break as we tell each other secrets through the 
infinity of the ages about our wordless minds. I said before that what was had already happened, 




only ever could be that small space of time when he was still breathing and my thoughts were 
still flying and the clouds made crisscrossed nets for animals flying high above our backs and 
reflected in the light of the frozen ice before I turned my head and saw the force hit the underside 
of the curve of our world, and before we first came, and before we cared to wonder, and before 
we danced hard out towards those stars, that’s the fragile place where his heart stopped beating 
and his mind stopped feeling and our mixing, merging thoughts shortened their tragically 
flowing movements and everything was all of a sudden and from within these few moments of 
time unbearably delicate and light, from without ultimately contingent upon the smallest 
operation occurring somewhere between the red wind on a dusty, faltering road where a girl’s 
head split open and filed growing, swelling sentiments away when the space connecting her 
thoughts got a little too close (far) and an extraterrestrial ocean that quietly from the bottom of its 
infinitely growing depths asked her how far (close) between thoughts she still needed to go, then 
gestured cautiously to its twin from the other side of the river, to offer kindness, through 
measures of how high and how far and how fast and how just so, how deep, how tiny, how soft, 
how unknown, it could be, when the edges of eternity closed over, nimbly, only those simple 
chasms it felt it needed to know: And from here it was then that both instances in the form of one 
slowly still started murmuring softness to her, making newer moments only so that it might have 
created pressure on her in just such a particular way as to regenerate the icy intensities of 
ceaselessness which used to illuminate the field at night, which used to extend beyond their 
heavenly absolution in broken units of reminiscence, which used to describe the tiny hours by 
whose recollection positional aspects of timebound eternity could slide interminably into one 
another, could skate, frictionless, around seconds that ached to rewrite themselves before the 




reticent, and relative, ever-splitting cabinets of aging memory when then the daylight grew older 
and fastened over the blink of an eye in front of space, in front of time, in front of wordless 
minds, in front of the backwards looping motions, in front of collections containing not a single 
of these; and from here too it was that she could see that when this extraterrestrial ocean and its 
twin that asked her the question and that hung all these thoughts together just so split apart they 
also at the opposing end of linearity combined together and both flowed upwards into the black 
abyss so that now these thoughts hang together in more extended union, as the same icy 
intensities of ceaselessness which are normally deafening, or the same unendingly frozen set of 
absolution stark amid transient portions of invincibility, or even possibly the same foiled waters 
usually thunderous and unbroken and continuous and ear-splitting, yet tonight these depths are 
faint and reprehensibly silent, straining to be heard, shivering more so into discontinued being, 
and falling at her feet alongside breathless reconstructions of the cold as the seasons close like 
curtains across that moonlit river of snow. Just for the infinitesimal uniqueness of now that’s the 
place that space became time and time became space and the same cosmic loneliness that has 
wandered the ages since the beginning of everything we ever really imagined tried to find one 
singular instance of non-repeat; that’s the place where you find the long road that is left to travel, 
the place you must meet me before any of this can ever happen, the place where it is quiet, 
empty, lonely, and cold, the place where his head looks curious from this angle, almost as though 
it contains some silver bullet, some embodiment of metal interwoven with dead thoughts and live 
sentiment, a portion of staunch reductionism held in high esteem by its own configurations, a 
place where the light hits a particular spot on the back of his head, bathing it awash in a silver 
glow, so that I can see the gleam of a tiny bit of metal buried deep behind his skull, within time, 




decision to leave, that one day, in his bubble, as it burst forward in the air, a dot soon on the 
horizon, walking between the rays of sunlight, until he can be seen no more, until finally, finally, 
finally, there he goe----he goes and has gone and will forever continue to go, until always, 
sometimes, never, he is----- 
The place where, slowly at first, we danced across the ice under a pink snow sky, sailing ever 
faster as we fell, unbounded, straight through the cosmos, riding out on the northern wind, to a 
spot with the unbearable lightness of a speck of dust, a single smile, a moment suspended 
through all of eternity; a place with hours that fall through the airstream as we see them behind 
us, with gradients of a tiny reckoning, with fallen patterns falling in patterns when we take our 
deepest hopes and wrap them around the confines of the splitting and push our bearings to the 
edge of the stars, so that we might find our way back from thinking outwards, after we are born 
and head out to the sun just to feel the brilliant starkness of what it means to be alive. It seems 
we at once always and never were, but now there’s just…a place, where one tired thought 
eclipses the rest of the daybreak: For this is where we will meet, before any of this can ever 
happen, before our thoughts will take hold and our moments will mix in their stumbling, and our 
fears will merge in that deeply red-stained sky; before our blood will spill out across a never-
ending line into the frozen sea below, before our universe of mirrors will turn backwards in its 
mind, before we will filter down through our own bare, throbbing existence, before we will 
gently catch the light and life of the finest layer of skin on the outside of our hands and reach the 
other from across the mind-terminating distance of a trillion, trillion, trillion, ever-expanding 
moments in time, and long, ever, before eternity will fold into itself, drawing aching shapes 
across the limitless depths of that black and starry sky… This is where we will find each other, 




unbroken in a unified septillion tiny pieces as each scatters, hard, through lonely storms carried 
across larger worlds on the winds, down through tunnels of spiraling spacetime, down through 
the one moment that connects a whole life, well… ahead of us staring down the moment hope 
bridged the gap of our sadness, in just that sort of empty way, there will be a figure, standing 
quietly in the distance, watching as the freezing lifts, our eyes in his mind, and when the dance 
becomes nothing but a small flicker on the horizon of our deepest dreams, the almost-same 
figure standing quietly in the distance will appear like a gray shadow of something unusual in the 
corner of our eyes, will stop us with barely any occasion in the un-ceasingness of the faltering 
peripheries of our awareness, and will ask us quietly if we know just how much life and sheer 
unboundedness a single memory connected by the delicate threads of a moment lost in time can 
hold, as a stranger we run into in on the street in the rush of the motion, as an isolated figure 
hidden in the daunted sweltering of our imaginations, as the one whom we will barely ever 
realize might contain the solution to that tricky game where nothing mixed with everything and 
entropy erased us, and we will feel that there is a mystery to this stranger’s depths, in some ways 
more than others, and we will feel all the empty space way out there, as this empty space comes 
closer, not so incautiously, but not that cautiously either, sort of nimbly, as though it has always 
been there, watching, but only just realized how interested it was in us now, and through all of 
this yet we cannot figure it out, and neither can all that empty space—not even the stranger 
knows: we don’t know what the thoughts are, or why they think themselves, or why they make 
us solid on a bright and sunny day, so we put these thoughts together, set them out like music to 
be played, and then they sweep through our lives, move them onwards, put them into place. But 
one day this figure, not knowing with as much force as we, will let itself forget a whole other 




before, ever, after, made to enter the illumined transience that forged us at the start of the line, 
made to enter softly, as we have done for thousands upon thousands of hours, into its own 
creation, and it will come upon our own set of stories and move into what “would” be. Then it 
“would” watch us, through the snow, dancing together, and a quiet, sad smile would shape its 
mind with a thought that extended just so to let it know we could never know for sure it was 
there, but still it would linger awhile, tracing the outlines of the rough brown bark on the trees 
that hug the banks of our frozen, quiet river placed snug in the vast, open expanse of everything, 
and at some point after the storm has passed, in the imperfect stillness of the dark, dark, deep and 
ever-slowing night, we will hear a noise, very faint, not even necessarily occurring, and it will 
leave, almost before it ever even came, almost before, almost after, almost unknowingly, and 
then very softly: a trace of its presence placed in the gap between the icy river and our skin, 
when the limits of what we can even being to think start to fade alongside our infinite doubt.  
[B]ecause it comes from the outside, too, the cognition, I am thinking now, as I was thinking 
then, back when the leaves were falling from the trees in great gusts of wind and the winter was 
closing in across the wayward forest, vines, and seas, and I continue to say later, in tones of 
omniscient, all-feeling light, as I play with a leaf, breaking it apart at the stem, crumbling it into 
an uncountable amount of pieces and letting them fly, unbroken in unity, into the wind. Here he 
feels a resonating incision of explosives in his mind, and felt and feels like he can’t find what he 
is looking for, can’t draw from the depths of his own waning soul any sentiment of peaceable 
protest, so he turns to the cold wind and makes like it and follows it all the way away from me, 
through the grass and by the berries and across the homes of a million little creatures, until he 
finds himself standing at the edge of the field, where I am nothing but a dot in the distance, still 




and seemed and will seem to; so cold, in fact, that his body feels in two places at once, feels 
perhaps like it might split apart across every imaginable pathway to join with the air around it, 
just so it might best accede to its commands; he feels and felt and will always feel like he’s 
interminably stuck, wanting to turn away from me, but not having the threshold to do it, not 
possessing the stimulus to force the action potential to concede, to push him forward through the 
air with which he begins to unite, to move his understanding past what was and always had been 
intermingled with his hardwiring and standing in front of him, by the tree. In a moment—a 
moment so long that it doesn’t and didn’t and couldn’t find itself to join with infinity—he stares 
across a line that never ends and begins spilling out onto the grass, onto the earth, the rock 
hurling through space, his blood and his bones and his muscles stronger in their apartness than 
ever before, in times when he was isolated from this pathway. At that time, his mind looks now 
and thinks frankly, completely and wholly in tune with a logic that prevails despite the sharpened 
edges of reality so entirely attuned to their own prevention of a reproachable recession to 
wholeness: that moment had everything in it, contained not one but anywhere from two to 
infinity gradients of truth. He had stood there, and found himself amid the inside influences, and 
not the outside influences of maximum absolution; he was there, he was absolutely there, and 
though his body had moved away, turned away, still he stopped on a whim, moved back, to look 
once more, to allow the light to enter his thoughts of me. But the dot was gone, and it had never 










Out in the unimaginably cold and vast cosmos there is nothing to feel except deep black 
space that spreads endlessly and forever, time and eternity that we don’t have words for yet. All 
this space stretches out and it’s silent, no such thing as noise, and what happens is that 
somewhere within this impossibly unending expansion and contraction of space and time there is 
a small point where everything freezes. It isn’t a singularity; it’s not where the existence ends or 
begins; it’s hardly even infinite. It’s just a small little hiccup, a random stopping point, among 
the eternal stretching, and then total, complete, absolute celestial silence that follows. A small 
speck of dust is frozen somewhere in that frame, the silent vague lightness of it, and that’s the 
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